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SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
A COMPARISON WITH UNITED STATES PRACTICE
Robert L. Knauss*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The most important securities market outside the United States is
that of the United Kingdom. In both countries, the securities markets
play a similar role and provide a viable method for the formation of
capital. There are, however, a number of fundamental as well as
practical differences in the methods by which the two countries have
chosen to regulate their securities markets. This article will examine
the current method and extent of securities regulation' in the United
Kingdom. In order to highlight certain aspects of the regulatory
pattern and to make the system more comprehensible to American
attorneys, this inquiry will require numerous comparisons with the
more familiar practices of the United States. Although any description
which includes such comparisons necessarily involves certain value
judgments, criticism as such is not intended.
There are three aspects of the regulatory pattern that are
fundamental to an understanding of securities regulation in the United
Kingdom-particularly in making any meaningful comparison to
securities regulation in the United States. The first involves the
statutory framework of securities regulation. In the United Kingdom,
as in most European countries, there is not so sharp a distinction
between corporation law and securities regulation as there is in the
United States. The Companies Act of 1948 contains regulations of the
type one would expect to see in a state corporation statute, as well as
restrictions on the public offer of securities. 2 On the other hand, an
* Dean and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A.,
1952, Harvard University; J.D., 1957, University of Michigan Law School.
Research support was provided by the American Society of International Law
and the University of Michigan Law School. Much of the research is based on
personal interviews conducted in 1968 and 1970. Regulatory changes occur
rapidly in both the United Kingdom and the United States, but the general

pattern remains as described.
1. Throughout this study the term "regulation" is used in the broad sense to
include not only statutory requirements, but also non-official sources of
regulation such as that accomplished by the London Stock Exchange and the
financial press.
2. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, as amended, Companies
Act of 1967, c. 81. Sections 1-5 provide for the method of incorporating the
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important element of securities law, licensing of securities brokers and
antifraud provisions, are found in a separate statute, the Prevention of
Fraud Act.3 Because of this integration of securities matters with
other business concerns, the term "securities regulation" is not used in
Great Britain. Problems such as those discussed in this article normally
would not be separated from questions involving dividend restrictions,
liquidation preferences or other regulatory aspects of corporation law.
A corollary to the difference in statutory framework is the dearth
of printed regulations, administrative rulings and cases in English
securities law. For example, the Companies and Insurance Department
of the Board of Trade, the regulatory agency of the government in
securities matters, has published few regulations and practically no
forms or releases in the last twenty years.' This lack of printed

material can be refreshing to the American attorney, but it may also
lead to frustration by placing a premium on personal contacts and
experience with unwritten procedure. The paucity of case law is
attributable at least in part to a philosophy of a less active regulatory
body. Although the Board of Trade has supervisory and rule-making
authority, it views its role as being primarily administrative-a
"watchdog and not a bloodhound."' Accordingly, the Board has
instituted formal proceedings under the Companies Act only when
evidence of a violation has been thrust upon it. Furthermore, while it
is possible for individuals to bring private actions for violations under
the Companies Act, there have been virtually no civil suits involving
registration and prospectus requirements, and only a handful of
private actions in the whole area of director frauds. Similarly, the
concept of the derivative suit by a shareholder is not widely known,
company in a manner paralleling most American state incorporation statutes.
Sections 37-46 deal with the contents of the prospectus and liability for
misstatements therein, paralleling requirements of the United States Securities Act
of 1933.
3. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45.
Sections 1-9 provide for the licensing of securities dealers. Sections 13 and 14
contain broad prohibitions against fraud in securities transactions.

4. The limited rules which have been promulgated include

STAT. INSTR.

1960, No. 1216 for rules restricting a dealer's acquiring and disposing of
securities. THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE LONDON STOCK
EXCHANGE [hereinafter cited as STOCK EXCHANGE RULES with reference to
enumerated rule] provide disclosure requirements for companies and regulation of
members. See also The Protection of Depositors Act of 1963, c. 16, § 1 (prohibition against fraudulent inducement to invest funds on deposit).
5. See THE REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, § § 11, 12, at
226-27 (1967) (discussion of the policy behind and the adequacy of the present

regulatory scheme) [hereinafter cited as the

JENKINS REPORT].
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and there appears to be a reluctance on the part of the individual
investor to initiate such an action. 6
The second basic aspect of securities regulation in the United
Kingdom is the dominant position of the London Stock Exchange.
Since there is no over-the-counter market in England as it is known in
the United States, there are few large issues of securities, other than
by "private companies," that do not obtain a quotation on the
London Exchange.' Moreover, a London Exchange quotation is
usually obtained for a securities issue at the time of distribution.8 As a
practical matter, therefore, the London Exchange is in a position to
scrutinize virtually every public offering.9 Although the Exchange has
printed requirements for listing, it rarely publishes accounts of its
rulings or enforcement activities beyond an annual report and
statistical summaries. Again, a premium is placed on knowledge of
unwritten practice.
The third factor, which is critical to any comparison between

securities regulation in the United States and Great Britain, is the
relative lack of marketing of securities in England. The customer's
account representative is unknown in the London market, and there
are virtually no branch offices of the major brokerage firms.' I A large

6. See R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 537 (1967). The absence of
contingent fee arrangements in Great Britain may be another factor in limiting the
use of the derivative suit.
7. As of 1962, there existed twenty stock exchanges in the United Kingdom,
in addition to the London Exchange, recognized by the Board of Trade. Five of
these, in addition to the London Exchange, are prescribed by the Board of Trade
under the Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 39, which gives
power to the Board of Trade to grant certificates of exemption. The membership
in the remaining fifteen exchanges is small, ranging from one to seventeen firms,
and from one to thirty-nine individual members. JENKINS REPORT, supra note
5, at § 256.
8. "Issues for which a stock exchange quotation are not sought are in practice
rare, and apart from issues of loan capital are relatively unimportant in
amount. . . ." JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at § 222.
9. The 21 British stock exchanges, together with the Dublin and Cork
Exchanges in the Irish Republic, are linked together in the Federation of Stock
Exchanges which was created in July, 1965, to coordinate regulation through
uniform rules. Individual brokers in the smaller cities are similarly bound together
by the common rules and regulations of the Provincial Brokers' Stock Exchange.
10. STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 57 (e) authorizes brokers' firms to establish
overseas branch offices, subject to specified conditions. In December, 1967,
STOCK EXCHANGE

RULE

57 (g) was added in order to permit the overseas

branch offices of British brokerage firms to hold memberships in overseas stock

exchanges.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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London brokerage firm with twenty partners may have only six
non-partners who deal with individual customers.'
The rules of the
London Stock Exchange expressly prohibit a broker from advertising
and from contacting an individual who is not already his client.' 2 This
restriction on marketing and selling efforts is even more basic than the
Stock Exchange regulations would indicate, for brokerage houses as a
matter of traditional practice do not attempt to attract the small
investor. Even with respect to the large investor or institution, the
typical London broker makes little selling effort compared with the
practice in the United States.' " In this regard, it is indicative that
individual British stockbrokers, in contrast to their American counterparts, usually are not compensated within their firm on a commission
basis. Instead, members and employees of the London firms are
generally paid a salary or receive a share of profits that has neither

direct nor indirect relationship to the volume of sales and trading.
Different investor attitudes are attributable to this difference in
selling practices. Until relatively recently, for example, British
investors and brokers were principally concerned with the income and
current yield of a security and not its potential for capital gain, which
is given far greater interest by the American investor. Accordingly,
stock brokers do not continually contact their clients with recommendations for switching from one investment to another, as is often
the case in the United States.
With these fundamental aspects of the regulatory pattern of English
securities law established, it remains to examine the law in greater
detail. The following inquiry will focus on the initial issuance of
securities in the United Kingdom. Much of the analysis will be spent
on a close scrutiny of the relative roles of the Companies Act of 1948
and the London Stock Exchange in regulating this phase of the British
securities market.

11. Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 120 (1) (c) (removed the limit of twenty
previously imposed on brokerage partnerships by the Companies Act of 1948, 11
& 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 434).
12. STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 78 (1).
13. The Stock Exchange itself does some advertising and supplies inquiries
with lists of brokers willing to take on new customers. Members of brokerage
firms are increasingly active in contacts with institutional investors, and some
brokerage firms have full time research analysts. However, the attitude among
most brokers has been that "an individual with less than £1000 to invest is more
trouble than he is worth."
Winter 1971
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II.

REGULATION OF THE INITIAL ISSUANCE OF SECURITIES

A.

The Distributionof Security Issues

1. The New Issue Market.-Companies in the United Kingdom
raise almost all of their externally generated long-term capital through
securities issues.14 On March 29, 1968, the London Exchange had
9,431 securities issues quoted. These listings included securities issued
by 3,673 companies registered and managed within Great Britain as
well as those of the British Government, various local government
authorities, foreign governments and foreign corporations.' 5 During
the year ending on the same date, the Exchange granted new
quotations for 1,351 securities issues. Included in these new quotations were the securities of 106 companies that were previously
unquoted. 6 Of these new quotations, 26 involved an offer for sale or
a prospectus offering for new equity shares. 1 7 In 1967, companies
quoted on the London Stock Exchange raised a total of 452.1 million
pounds, representing 81.4 million pounds through the issue of
ordinary shares with the remainder representing preference or debt
18

securities.
It is rare to have an issue of either debt or equity securities of a
large

public company

in

Great Britain that does not receive a

14. This is in marked contrast to the situation in the United States, where
there is an emphasis on long-term individual loans. Companies in the United
Kingdom occasionally obtain long-term funds through mortgages or other secured
loans from a single institutional creditor, but the unsecured loan with a term
greater than five years is rare. The British creditor institutions normally want a
large loan split into bonds or debentures and distributed to others in addition to
themselves. The prime example of an attempt to fill this void is the growth of the
Finance Corporation for Industry, Inc. (FCI) which arose because of the inability
or unwillingness of other financial institutions to provide long-term corporate
financing. The FCI is discussed together with similar institutions and finance
corporations in BRITISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (published by Her
Majesty's Stationary Office 1966).
15.

STATISTICS RELATING

TO SECURITIES

QUOTED

ON THE LON-

DON STOCK EXCHANGE, FOR THE YEAR ENDING 29 MARCH 1968, at 2
(1968) [hereinafter cited as EXCHANGE STATISTICS ].
16. EXCHANGE STATISTICS, supra note 15, at 5, 6. Included in the 106

companies are 10 overseas companies.
17. In 1965, the total amount of municipal securities issued in the United
States was $17.6 billion; in 1966, the dollar total was the same. NYSE FACT
BOOK 59 (1967).
18. EXCHANGE STATISTICS, supra note 15, at 5. In addition, 11 of the
106 quotations for new companies involved tender offers. These terms are
explained in notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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quotation on the London Stock Exchange.' 9 Creditor institutions
desire a listing of the debt securities that they acquire through
placements primarily for evaluation purposes. In addition, some
pension funds are restricted in their investments to listed securities,
and insurance company regulations require them to report the extent
of their security holdings which are not listed."0 A listing enables an
institution to report its security holdings based on the stock exchange
offer and bid prices even though it is recognized that there may be
little or no active trading in the securities.
A major distinction between the securities markets in the United
States and Great Britain is that in the United Kingdom all government
borrowing, both by the central government and by local authorities,
goes through the London Exchange. In the United States, the stock
exchanges are generally not involved in government borrowing either
by the federal government or by states and municipalities.2"
Financial institutions, such as insurance companies, pension funds,
investment trusts and unit trusts, play an important role in the British
securities market.22 Recent statistics indicate that such institutions
hold approximately 56 per cent of the fixed interest securities quoted
on the London Exchange and account for approximately 60 per cent
of the trading in fixed interest securities. These same tables show that
these financial institutions hold approximately 25 per cent of the
ordinary shares and account for approximately 23 per cent of the
trading of these shares. In contrast to the United States, the dominant

group in Great Britain among these institutions is the insurance
companies, followed by the pension funds and the investment trusts.
Unit trusts that are comparable to open-end mutual funds in the
United States are growing rapidly, but they still do not play so major a
role as in the United States.2 3 It is estimated that British insurance
19. It is estimated that it would cost a company approximately one-half of
one per cent more to raise funds by means of a long-term institutional loan rather
than through the device of a bond issue. Furthermore, it would cost an additional
one-half of one per cent if the bond issue were not quoted on the London Stock
Exchange.
20. See Trustee Investment Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 62 (specific
investment standards for trustees).
21. 4 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. 314 tab. 14 (1968).
22. See HOBSON, HOW THE CITY WORKS (rev. ed. 1966); R. KELLETT,
THE MERCHANT BANKING ARENA (1967); BRITISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 14. See also 2 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. tab. 23 & 24
(1965) (statistical measure of the importance of the role of financial institutions
in the securities market of Great Britain).
23. The number of unit holdings has risen from £0.66 million in 1960 to
£1.64 million by 1966. The number of reporting trusts increased from 53 to 138.
Winter 1971
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companies have about 20 per cent of their total portfolio in equity
securities compared with estimates of approximately 4 per cent in the
United States. 24
2. Method of Security Issuance.-A major problem in understanding the securities market in the United Kingdom is the variety of
terminology involved. The Companies Act of 1948 uses one set of
terms, the London Stock Exchange another, and the financial
community often uses a third. It is essential to understand these
differences in terminology at the outset.
The Companies Act of 1948 provides for a "private company,"
which is defined as a company which restricts the rights of
shareholders to transfer their shares; limits the number of shareholders
to 50 not including employees and certain other exempted categories; and prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for
any shares or debentures. Of the approximately 500,000 companies
which are registered under the Companies Act, all but 15,000 are
"private companies." 2 By definition, the prospectus and registration
requirements in the Companies Act apply only to public companies. If
a private company attempts to sell securities to the public, it loses the
privileges of the "private company" exemption.2 6

Total assets increased from £220 million to £553 million.

CENTRAL

STATISTI-

CAL OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATISTICS, No. 60, at 66-67 tab. 58 & 59 (1967).

Recent statistics indicate that this rise is continuing. 4 BANK OF ENGLAND Q.
BULL. 318 tab. 17 (1968). See generally MERRIMAN, MUTUAL FUNDS AND
UNIT TRUSTS: A GLOBAL VIEW (1965).
24. FINANCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 70-71 tab. 61. Company

securities accounted for approximately £70 million of the net £163 million
invested by insurance companies in the fourth quarter of 1966. Of these £70
million, £19 million represented investment in ordinary shares.
25. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28, provides for the
"private company." Sections 29 and 30 deal respectively with the consequences
of losing the private company exemption and the "statement in lieu of a
prospectus" to be delivered to the Registrar of Companies upon cessation of private
company status. Originally private companies could achieve an "exempt" status
which required less annual reporting among other advantages. See Companies
Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § § 129, 161 (1), 161 (2), 190 (1) & 410 (1).
This exempt status was abolished, however, in the 1967 amendments. Companies
Act of 1967, c. 81, § 2.
26. The advantages of remaining a private company are disappearing. The
most recent tax laws have added a corporate surtax for private as well as public
corporations and the Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 2, requires an annual
report, including balance sheet and profit and loss statements, for private
companies. See note 25 supra.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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Under the Companies Act of 1948, a public company is exempted
from the prospectus requirements when the issue involves shares or
debentures that are not offered to the public. Consequently, there is a
legal problem in Great Britain similar to that in the United States of
defining a "public offering." There is a major difference, however, in
that as a practical matter the British legal problem usually does not
have to be resolved because almost all securities issues by public
companies obtain a listing on a stock exchange. The obtaining of an
exchange listing is considered to result automatically in an offer of the
securities to the public.
Under the London Stock Exchange's regulations, the listing of a
security may be obtained when it is issued by any of the following
methods: 2 '7
(1) public prospectus.-By this method, the company sells the
securities to members of the public directly without an intermediate purchase of the shares by a brokerage house, as in a firm
commitments underwriting. An issuing house may be involved in
marketing the securities on a basis similar to a "best efforts"
underwriting in the United States. The public prospectus method
of distribution had an early popularity, but is now used
infrequently.
(2) public offer for sale.-Through a public offer for sale, which

is the most common form of underwriting in both Great Britain
and the United States, securities of the company are purchased
by an issuing house and resold to the public. This is similar in
operation to a firm commitments underwriting in the United
States.
(3) placing.-This term has no reference to "private offering"
for regulatory purposes or to "private placement," as the term is
used in the United States. Placing is used to describe those
instances in which the issuing house has purchased the security
offering and distributed the bulk directly to large investors,
usually institutions, rather than to the public by means of
advertisement. Placings are not "underwritten" by institutions,
but are distributed directly to them. Even in a placing, however,
a substantial portion of the total shares issued must be made
available to the general public if a quotation is desired.
(4) introduction.-Outstandingsecurities are introduced on the
London Exchange when there is no new public offering. This is

27. The terms refer to the method of underwriting and not to requirements
under the Companies Act of 1948.
Winter 1971
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the usual method employed when securities previously have been
listed on a regional exchange, or where a formerly private
company is seeking a listing in order to establish a public price
for its shares but is not raising new capital. Recently, because the
advantages of remaining a private company have diminished,
numerous private companies have introduced their shares on the
London Exchange. 8
(5) tender.-Underthe tender method, securities are offered for
competitive bidding by subscribers. A minimum price is set, and
normally some underwriting commitment is made.
Obtaining a quotation by any of these methods may or may not
demand compliance with the Companies Act of 1948. Although all

five methods involve "offerings to the public" as defined in the Act
and would be subject to its provisions, some other exemption may
exclude the issue from the Act's coverage. 29
In the United Kingdom, issues are underwritten not only by other
brokers and investment bankers, but also by investors who themselves
are able to take part of the issue. In a large offering, sub-underwriting
agreements may be sent to 500 institutions. This group might include
insurance companies, pension funds and investment trusts. Unit trusts
do not play a significant role in underwriting because they rarely have
available large unused amounts of capital.
Sub-underwriters agree with the issuing house, i.e., the principal
underwriter, to take a portion of the issue in return for a set fee. The
sub-underwriters are obligated to purchase the shares in the event that
the issue is not fully sold. In contrast to the situation in the United
States, the sub-underwriters are obligated not directly to the company, but rather to the principal underwriter only." This distinction
28. Introductions typically constitute the bulk of new listings on the
Exchange. In 1966-67, of the 106 companies not previously listed, 61 were listed
pursuant to applications for introduction of one of their securities. EXCHANGE
STATISTICS, supra note 15, at 5.
29. In 1967-68, 106 listings for companies on the Exchange were granted. Of
these companies' securities, 61 were applications for introduction, 26 were offers
for sale or prospectus offerings, 25 were private placements and 11 were tender
offers. For definitions of the Exchange's terms describing different methods of
securities offerings see, JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 1160. In addition,
listings may be obtained for rights offerings and for securities previously quoted at
a Federated Stock Exchange, of which there were 14 in 1967. EXCHANGE
STATISTICS.

supra note 15, at 5.

30. In the United States, underwriting syndicates are made up only of brokers
and investment bankers. Through the "agreement between underwriters," the
members of the syndicate authorize the principal underwriter to sign for them and
Vol. 5-No. 1
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regarding liability, however, appears to be of little practical importance. A more significant difference is that in Great Britain, most
of the sub-underwriters are also the principal investors. The sub-underwriters usually agree to "underwrite" that portion of an issue that
they intend to purchase for their own portfolio. 1 Institutional
investors who are sub-underwriters rely principally on the reputation
of the issuing house in making their sub-underwriting decision.
Sub-underwriters, however, do have an opportunity to see the
prospectus several days before the general investing public.
In the actual selling of the securities, the issuing house that is acting
as principal underwriter takes the majority of shares for distribution
and allots a smaller share to brokers for distribution through the
London Exchange. The broker then distributes his shares to the
public. This may or may not involve contacting some of the same
institutions that are involved in the sub-underwriting.
If the issuing house is conducting a public offer for sale, it

advertises by publishing a prospectus and follows the specified
allotment procedures for distributing the shares to all investors who
subscribe. The amount of subscription made by individual sub-underwriters depends on their evaluation of the offering. If they do not
believe the offering will be over subscribed, the sub-underwriters may
not subscribe themselves at all, but may instead rely on obtaining a
share on the basis of their sub-underwriting commitment. If, on the
other hand, the individual sub-underwriters believe that the issue will
be over subscribed, they will place a subscription based on the number
of shares they actually want for their portfolio. In the case of a
placement, the issuing house does not advertise, but rather sells
directly to its sub-underwriters and other large investors. In either a
distribution by advertisement and allotment or a distribution by
placement, a substantial percentage of shares must be made available
to brokers and jobbers.3 2
become legally bound directly to the company. Such an "agreement between
underwriters" is used in a "firm commitment" underwriting where the managing
underwriter and his selling group contract with the selling company to purchase
all of the securities for resale. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
159-178 (2d ed. 1961); G.J. ROBINSON, GOING PUBLIC § § 26-34 (1961).
31. Institutional investors do agree at times to participate in an underwriting
even when they do not wish to hold the securities in their portfolio. Such a
participation derives from a desire to maintain a good relationship with the issuing
house. In these situations, if the offering is not a success and the institution is
required to take up the shares, the institution is forced either to include the
securities in their portfolio or hold them until they are sold.

32. A jobber in a private placement can keep only 10% of the stock made
available to him in order to start his book. What happens in practice is that the
Winter, 1971
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In both a placement and an offer for sale, a full prospectus is
required. In addition, if there is an offer for sale, the full prospectus
must be published in a newspaper, and sale is by subscription. The
advertisement is published three days before the stock lists are closed.
If the issue is over subscribed, allotment is usually made on a pro rata
basis, by lottery, or some other means designed to protect the small
investor. If the issue is under subscribed, the principal underwriter and
sub-underwriters must make up the difference.
Almost all equity offerings of established companies that take place
by one of the above stated methods have been made by means of
rights offerings in recent years.3 3 In a rights offering, the issuihg
house serves principally as adviser, but it may also underwrite the
rights offering on a standby basis. When companies issue rights for
new shares at a price close to the current market price, the company
usually retains the existing dividends on the new shares and has the

issue underwritten by an issuing house. When the rights issue for the
new shares is at a price substantially different from the current market
price, the rights themselves acquire value and are traded. Under these
circumstances, there usually would not be an underwriting since the
company would be assured that the issue would be taken. In addition,
the dividend would be reduced on the new shares.
A typical timetable in the United Kingdom for an offering to the
public involving advertising and subscription is as follows:
(1) day one (usually a Wednesday).-Assuming prior clearance
for an exchange listing, the final price for the offering is fixed
and letters and calls are made to the potential sub-underwriters.
(2) day three (Friday).-The underwriting is completed.
(3) day six (Monday).-The advertisement appears in the financial press, usually in the London Times and the Financial Times,
and the prospectus must be delivered to the Registrar of
Companies at the Board of Trade on or before the date of
publication.

broker for the issue allocates to the jobber a block of shares at the distribution
price. Other brokers not connected with the issue then come to the jobber and ask
to be allocated amounts of shares. After the shares are distributed, the jobber
leaves 10% on his book for his own use at the commencement of trading. The
shares are allocated to the other brokers at the issue price so that, in effect, the
jobber receives an extra commission for these shares.
33. The London Exchange rules have special provisions designed to facilitate
the making of a rights offering and enumerate the privileges and liabilities of the
parties. See STOCK EXCHANGE RULES 114, 114 (a) & 115. Normally, a
company will have a provision respecting pre-emptive rights in its by-laws.
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(4) day nine (Thursday).-The stock lists close and the allotment is made.
(5) day ten (Friday).-Dealingstarts on the stock exchange. 34
During the period between day six and day nine, stock exchange
brokers are usually involved in contacting clients concerning the
offering. The principal contacts would be with large investors and
institutions, including those who are acting as sub-underwriters and
have already expressed a commitment on the prior Friday. By
American standards, the actual sales activity by brokers during the
time of distribution is usually small.
B. Regulation Under the Companies Act
Regulation of securities in England started in an extreme form with
the Bubble Act of 1719, which prohibited joint stock companies
altogether. This Act was a reaction to the spectacular stock frauds
climaxed by the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. The complete
restriction on the existence of corporations proved unworkable,
however, and the Act was repealed in 1825.
The next approach to regulation came in 1841 as a result of a Royal
Commission under the direction of Lord Gladstone. The Commission,
after cataloguing the various evils associated with joint stock companies, advocated in the Companies Act the use of a disclosure
mechanism that has continued to the present as the basis of regulation
in Great Britain. The initial requirements were meager and amounted
to little more than a requirement to file the name and purpose of the
company. The requirements were tied closely to the process of
registration and to the obtaining of limited liability for shareholders.
Regulatory control under the Companies Act has, however, been
gradually tightened through successive amendments.3 5 For example,
disclosure requirements in the articles of association have been
increased; requirements have been established for the use and filing of
the prospectus; the content of the prospectus has been specified; civil
liability of parties preparing the articles and prospectus has been
tightened; and the distinctions have been made between private and
public companies, with disclosure and prospectus requirements applying only to the latter. Recognizing the need for the disclosed material
34. If there are delays, dealing may not start until the following Monday. If
there is heavy over subscription, then letters of allotment may not be posted until
Monday and dealing may not start until later in the week.
35. The last complete codification of the Act was in 1948, but there were
amendments in 1967. See note 2 supra; see Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of
Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 611-13 & nn.19-32 (1964).
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to reach investors, underwriter offerings were made subject to the
Act's prospectus requirements in 1929.
1.

Restrictions of Distributions.-TheCompanies Act contains two

basic prohibitions. The first is that every prospectus3 6 issued by a
company or a promoter of a company must contain specified
material.3 7 The second is that no prospectus shall be issued by a
company unless it has been filed with the Registrar of Companies of
the Board of Trade before the date of its publication.3 8 Since by
definition a "private company" cannot offer securities to the public
and maintain its status as a "private company," the restrictions apply
39
only to public companies.
The approach of the Companies Act is similar to the registration
and prospectus requirements of the 1933 Securities Act in the United
States. In both countries, for example, no written offer can be made
unless it is in the form of a prospectus that conforms with the
requirements of the respective acts, and is filed with the appropriate
government agency. The Companies Act, however, does not provide a
number of restrictions found in the 1933 Act. For instance, unlike its
American counterpart, the Companies Act does not prohibit oral
offers or the private use of a prospectus prior to its publication and
filing. Similarly, there is no requirement under the Companies Act to
deliver a copy of the prospectus to offerees or purchasers at the time
of sale.40
There is no specific statutory waiting period in Great Britain, and
after the prospectus has been filed with the Registrar of Companies
sales may be made immediately. However, if there is to be a public
subscription for the shares, the Companies Act requires a three day
36. "Prospectus" is defined in the Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.
38, § 455, as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or other invitation,
offering to the public for subscription or purchase any shares or debentures of a
company." In addition, § 45 provides that when a company allots any of its
shares with a view toward offering them for sale, any document by which the

offering is to be made is deemed to be a prospectus. By general concensus, the
term is limited to written offers.
37. The Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 38, requires the
company to set forth in its prospectus the information contained in part I of the
Fourth Schedule to the Act, and to set out the reports in part II prior to the
offering.
38. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 41.
39. See L. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (3d. ed.
1969). Oral invitations are covered by the Prevention of Fraud Act of 1958.
40. However, any form of application for shares of a company must be
accompanied by a prospectus. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §
38 (3).
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delay between the issuance of the prospectus and the allotment of the
shares. The Act further provides that if there is a newspaper
advertisement, the date upon which it appears shall be construed as
the first day of issue of the prospectus.4 1 Thus, there is usually a
three day delay. But this delay does not appear to be designed
primarily as a "waiting period," as the term is known in the United

States. It is possible for sales to be made immediately unless a public
subscription and allotment method is to be used.4 2 The concept of
the minimum "waiting period" as a cooling time apparently is not
considered so important in Great Britain as in the United States,
perhaps because of the lesser selling pressure. Rather, the three day
delay is intended to provide investors with an equal opportunity to
purchase shares.
The Companies Act either ignores or provides exemptions for many
of the problems that cause headaches for attorneys in the United
States. The Companies Act has two major exemptions not found in
the American securities acts. The first exempts securities that are in all
respects similar to shares or debentures previously issued, if those
previously issued are currently being traded or quoted on a prescribed
stock exchange.4 3 The second is a specific exemption to the
prospectus requirements for offers of securities by a company to its
own shareholders." Furthermore, the Companies Act applies only to
a company and to the underwriters who are in fact acting in a
professional capacity. There is no open-ended definition of the term
"underwriter" as it appears in § 2(11) of the 1933 Securities Act in
the United States.4" This means that in Great Britain there are no
restrictions on secondary distributions by control persons, and that
problems concerning resales following a private offering are avoided.
Another important contrast between the Companies Act and the 1933
41. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 50.
42. See JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 1478-79.
43. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 38 (5) (b).
44. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 38 (5) (a). Section 55
cancels such exemptions when they are used, directly or indirectly, to make the
shares available to the public. Thus while such an offer will be a "prospectus" in
many cases, there are virtually no statutory requirements about what it must
contain. See COLE, MORLEY & SCOTT, CORPORATE FINANCING IN GREAT
BRITAIN 3 4 (1967).
45. The Securities Act of 1933, § 2 (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b) (11) (1970),
defines "underwriter" as "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view
to, or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or
participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or
participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking...."
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Securities Act is that there is no need to register oil and gas interests,
limited partnership interests, or the broad range of investment plans
46
that fall under the 1933 Act's definition of "investment contract.,
The definition of "prospectus" in the Companies Act refers to any
offer to the public "for subscription or purchase."'" While the
question is not completely free from doubt, this has been interpreted
to exclude from the prospectus requirements any offer involving an
exchange of securities. The terms "subscription" and "purchase" have
been defined as being limited to purchases or subscriptions in cash.
Therefore, registration and prospectus requirements and the "no-sale"
48
problems in the typical merger situation are avoided.
The term "prospectus" is defined in the Companies Act as being an

offering "to the public." '49 Thus, on the surface, the Companies Act

and the 1933 Securities Act appear similar in their references to public
offerings. In operation, however, the terms have developed quite
differently. The Companies Act states that an offer or invitation is not
considered made "to the public" if
it can properly be regarded, in all circumstances, as not being calculated to
result, directly or indirectly, in the shares or debentures becoming available
for subscription or purchase by persons other than those receiving the offer
or invitation, or otherwise as being a domestic concern of the persons
making and receiving it.50
Although there has been practically no litigation in Great Britain on
the question of what amounts to a public offering, certain guidelines
are generally accepted.51 It is clear that the prospectus requirements
do not apply to private companies, since by definition the number of
shareholders must be limited and the securities cannot be freely
purchased or traded. Also, stock options and stock purchase plans to
46. Compare the very broad definition of "security" in the Securities Act of
1933, § 2 (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b) (1) (1970) with the limited definition of
"share" in the Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 455. The leading
United States case interpreting "investment contract" as used in § 2 (1) of the
1933 Act is S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
47. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 455; note 36 supra.
48. Apparently the only case in Great Britain construing these terms is
Government Stock and Other Securities Investment Co., Ltd. v. Christopher,
[1956] 1 W.L.R. 237. In the United States, rule 133 promulgated pursuant to the
1933 Act offers a limited exemption for the exchange of shares in certain mergers,
but there is no exemption for any subsequent resale of such shares.
49. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 455; note 36 supra.
50. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 455.
51. See note 48 supra; D.B. BUCKLEY, BUCKLEY ON THE COMPANIES
ACT 83 (12th ed. 1949); A. TOPHAM, PALMER'S PRECEDENTS 54 (16th ed.

1951).
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employees of a company are considered exempted as private offerings.
A public offering occurs only if the prospectus concerns shares which
are to be quoted on a stock exchange. Since securities are rarely sold
by public companies without obtaining a stock exchange quotation,
the difficult interpretative problems frequently encountered in the
United States rarely arise.
This combination of exemptions means that from one-half to
two-thirds of all registration statements filed in the United States
would not be required under the Companies Act." For example, all
1933 Act filings under Form S-8-employee purchase and stock
option plans-and Form S-14-mergers and consolidations-would be
unnecessary. Most secondary offerings and all offerings of currently
listed securities would not be registered. Finally, if the offering is

made to an identifiable group, no registration would be required for
securities that are not going to be traded.
One result of the series of exemptions in Great Britain is that a
company may obtain a stock exchange quotation for a new issue of
shares and yet not need to comply with the prospectus and filing
provisions of the Companies Act. Securities that are uniform with
existing listed securities, securities listed for issue to existing shareholders in rights offerings, and securities listed for use in mergers must
all comply with stock exchange requirements, but they are exempted
under the Companies Act. Since many listing quotations obtained on
the London Stock Exchange are in these categories, the. number of
prospectuses filed under the Companies Act is much less than the
number of new quotations obtained on the Exchange.
In addition to the prospectus requirements of the Companies Act,
all sales of securities in the United Kingdom are regulated by the
licensing and general fraud provisions of the Prevention of Fraud Act
of 1958. The definition of securities in this Act is broader than in the
Companies Act, and the fraud provisions cover sales of corporate
securities and interests in other investment schemes that would fall
within the definition of "investment contract" in the 1933 Securities
Act.5 3 Furthermore, the licensing requirements of the Prevention of

52. DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS. A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES ACTS, ch. 10 (discusses
the enormous work load of the S.E.C.) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].

53. Misleading statements or failures to disclose material facts in any
arrangement ". . . which is to provide facilities for the participation by persons in

profits or income.., likely to arise from the acquisition, holding, management or

disposal of any property other than securities... ." is prohibited. The Prevention
of Fraud Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, § 13 (1) (b).
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Fraud Act limit those individuals who can be in the securities business

and give the Board of Trade broad discretion and rule-making power.
The Board of Trade has exercised its rule-making authority in only
two special areas: take-over bids and unit trusts, i.e., mutual funds.5 4
2. Prospectus Requirements Under the Companies Act.-Various
sections of the Companies Act of 1948 contain provisions relating to
prospectus requirements. Section 37 requires every prospectus to be
dated, and raises a rebutable presumption that the date of the
prospectus is the date of publication. Section 38 requires that the
prospectus contain the information referred to in part I of the Fourth
Schedule of the Companies Act, as well as the reports specified in part
II of the Fourth Schedule. Section 41 requires that a prospectus must
be delivered to the Registrar of Companies in the Board of Trade on
or before its date of publication. It must be signed by every person
who is named as a director or proposed director and must contain:
(1) the consent of experts required by § 40;" (2) a copy of every
"material contract," as required by paragraph 14 of the Fourth
Schedule; and (3) any written statements by auditors setting out any
adjustments made in the preparation of the financial statements.
The actual substance of the material to be disclosed is set forth in
the Fourth Schedule of the Companies Act. While the material
required is generally quite similar to that required for a listing by the
London Stock Exchange, there are a few primary differences. For
instance, the London Exchange has specified in greater detail the
information required in the financial statements and specifically
requires a ten year auditor's report on profits and losses; the Fourth
Schedule, however, requires only a five year report. Also, while part

II, paragraph 14 of the Fourth Schedule requires material contracts to

be submitted with the prospectus, the London Exchange has no such
formal rule. As a practical matter, companies in the United Kingdom
concentrate on the listing requirements of the London Exchange and
merely file in duplicate the material prepared in that connection with
the Board of Trade.
3. Sanctions.-The Registrar of Companies in the Board of Trade
does virtually no checking of the prospectus material that is filed with
54. Take-over bids are discussed pp. 128-32 infra; unit trusts are discussed
pp.116-27 infra.

55. Every prospectus, which includes statements purported to be made by
experts-i.e., engineers, appraisers, accountants and any other person whose
profession lends authority to a statement made by him-must contain a written
consent by the expert. The prospectus must also contain a statement that the
expert has given and has not withdrawn his consent as it appears in the
prospectus. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 40.
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that agency. The Act specifically provides that "the registrar shall not
register a prospectus unless it is dated, signed in the manner required,
and unless it has attached the documents specified." 6 The Board of
Trade has read this section very narrowly and has made no attempt to
expand its jurisdiction to include the power to scrutinize or to police
the filed prospectus. The purpose of the filing of a prospectus is
viewed merely as providing individuals with the information needed to
bring civil actions.
The staff in the Registrar of Companies office considers their
function to be primarily a clerical one. Occasionally a company will
send a proof of a prospectus to the Registrar two or three days before
the issue date, but most prospectuses are received for the first time on
the morning of the issue date, which if advertized is the day it appears
in the financial press. As a matter of routine, the prospectuses are
checked by the staff for six items:
(1) date.-If a prospectus is lodged after the date on the
prospectus, there is provision for penalties, but reportedly these
have never been imposed.
(2) directors' signatures.-A check is made to see that all of the
directors named in the prospectus have signed it, or if the
signature is made by another under power of attorney, that the
power is included among the documents filed.
(3) experts.-A check is made to see that a letter of consent has
been filed for every expert who is quoted in the prospectus.
(4) material contracts.-These are checked to insure that all
specific contracts mentioned in the prospectus are included. No
attempt is made, however, to determine if there are other,
non-material contracts.
(5) accounting statement.-A sight check is made to determine
if the accounting statements of adjustments is included in the
prospectus materials.

(6) statement of filing.-The prospectus must include a statement that it has been filed with the Registrar of Companies.
Any deficiencies that are discovered by the Registrar's office are
handled in an informal way. 7 For example, a question may be raised
about the opinion of an expert if no consent statement is present. In
56. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 41 (3).
57. The author could find no reported instance when the Registrar refused to
file a prospectus. It was reported that the Registrar on a few occasions had
forwarded a prospectus to the Prosecutions Department of the Board of Trade
because the prospectus "did not look right," but there is no information available
on what action was taken.
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this situation, a call may be made to the company, and a request made
that the consent statement be forwarded. The Prosecutions Department, the only section within the Board of Trade staffed by solicitors,
is concerned almost exclusively with fraudulent activity under the
Prevention of Fraud Act and instances of fraud that come to light
upon liquidation of a company. There is no reported instance of any
enforcement for prospectus violations. The assumption within the
Board of Trade is that the Quotations Department of the London
Stock Exchange prevents any dubious prospectus from being filed.
There are apparently no formal records kept by the Board of Trade
on the number and type of prospectuses that are filed. Some informal
records, including material contracts, are maintained primarily for
internal use by the staff of the Registrar of Companies. While the
general public has access to these documents, it is reported that they
are examined only rarely by persons outside the Registrar's office.
These records indicate that during 1966, for example, there were 269
"full" prospectuses filed with the Registrar of Companies. In addition,
during that year the Registrar received 194 letters from the London
Stock Exchange noting that either a full or partial exemption to filing
had been granted under § 39 of the Companies Act. Although
no official statistics are available on the matter, it is estimated that less
than 10 per cent of the 269 prospectuses filed during 1966 involved
issues that did not obtain a listing on a recognized stock exchange.

C. The Role of the London Stock Exchange in Regulating
the Issuance of Securities
The London Stock Exchange plays the dominant role in the
regulation of the securities market in the United Kingdom. The
dominance of the Exchange is due not to any direct statutory
authority, but rather to the practicalities of the British new issue
market. Almost all new security issues obtain a listing on the London
Exchange. Moreover, the facilities of the Exchange are employed
during distribution, and trading on the Exchange commences as soon
as the distribution is complete. Such activity by the London Exchange
is in sharp contrast to exchange practices in the United States, where
the initial distribution cannot take place on an exchange and no
previously unlisted company can obtain a listing until the distribution
of securities is complete. In America, all initial distributions take place
in the over-the-counter market and the exchanges are not in a position
to play any regulatory role during the distribution process. A second
major factor contributing to the dominant position of the London
Exchange is that members of the Exchange are permitted to deal only
in listed securities and securities in certain specified categories.5 8 In
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the United States, however, broker-dealers who are members of an
exchange can trade and sell securities that are not listed on that
exchange. Thus, the use of Exchange facilities during the distribution
process, together with its restrictive trading rules, operates to give the
London Exchange a near monopoly over the British new issue market.
One result flowing from this pre-eminant position is the listing of many
issues that have received no widespread interest and that have no
active trading market, whereas in the United States, listing on a major
exchange is restricted to securities that have demonstrated substantial
trading interest.

The involvement of the London Stock Exchange in distributions
has provided the means by which the Exchange has become an
important regulatory body. Since there cannot be an extensive public
offering unless there is a stock exchange quotation, the Exchange can
limit entry into the market by controlling the granting of the listing
quotation. To be sure, there are other regulatory forces in connection
with a new issue of securities, such as the issuing house, charter public
accountants, solicitors, and the financial press, but it is the activity of
the London Exchange which has become increasingly more important.
An assessment of the London Exchange's success as a regulatory
force would have been generally negative if made as recently as 1960.
Since that time, however, the Exchange has moved farther than in the
preceeding 100 years. As a point of reference, the regulatory activity
of the London Exchange accelerated dramatically after the publication of the Jenkins Committee Report in 1962. Although this report
was not directly critical of the activities of the London Exchange, it is
apparent that the occasion of giving evidence to the Jenkins
Committee provided the Exchange with an opportunity for self-examination. And it is probably not unfair to state that the Exchange has
been responding to various subtle pressures in order to avoid the
introduction of new and more rigorous legislation.
The following items are examples of important regulatory activity
recently undertaken by the London Exchange:
(1) the memorandum of November, 1964, regarding accounting
standards for data contained in prospectuses;
(2) the memorandum of guidance regarding acquisitions,
published in April, 1964;
(3) the compilation and publication of various memoranda of
guidance in June, 1966, concerning the admission of securities to
quotation, the "yellow book;"5 9
58.

STOCK ExCHANGE RULE

163.

59.

COUNCIL OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE, ADMISSION OF SECURITIES
TO QUOTATION: MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE AND REQUIREMENTS OF
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(4) more effective scrutiny of the quality and completeness of
the prospectus by the professional staff of the Exchange;
(5) increased regulation of circulars sent to shareholders;
(6) the development of an effective Federation of Stock
Exchanges, 6" with the London Exchange playing the controlling
role by having its staff review all listing applications even when it
is only on a local exchange;
(7) increased activity in the regulation of brokers and jobbers,

including the new requirement that accounts be submitted to an
61
exchange accountant;
(8) an increase in the number and caliber of the professional
staff; and
(9) a more effective role of the Exchange in the continuing
development of the Take-Over Bid Code.
1. Administration.-The London Stock Exchange is managed by
the Stock Exchange Council. The Council is composed of from 30 to
36 members of the Exchange, divided about equally between jobbers
and brokers. 62 The members of the Council serve for a term of three
years, with approximately one-third of the membership elected
annually. 63 There are two deputy chairmen, usually one broker and
one jobber. The Council itself is split into several committees, one of
which, the Quotations Committee, 64 has the ultimate responsibility of
THE FEDERATION

OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND

IRELAND (1966) [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE]. This
volume, commonly known as the "yellow book," is a compilation of memoranda
entitled: (1) Admission of Securities to Quotation; (2) Reports by Accountants ... ; (3) Acquisitions and Realization of Subsidiary Companies ... ; (4)
Information Required in Prospectuses... ; (5) Requirements for Quotation for
the Securities of Foreign Companies... ; and (6) Communication of Announcements. The "yellow book" supplements the Stock Exchange rules and provides
standards for all of the federated stock exchanges.
60. The provincial exchanges in the United Kingdom may be compared to the
regional exchanges in the United States. The requirements for a quotation,
however, are now standardized in Great Britain under the rules of the Federation
of Stock Exchanges, which follow the London Stock Exchange requirements. See
note 9 and accompanying text supra.
61. Regulation of accounts of members was first introduced in 1962; the rules

were revised and strengthened in August, 1966.
62. In the recent past, the Chairman of the Stock Exchange has been a
broker.
63. The members may be re-elected and some of them have served for a
considerable period of time.
64. The Quotations Committee has two chairmen, a broker and a jobber; two
vice-chairmen, a broker and a jobber; and eight members. Five members are
required for a quorum.
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passing on all requests for quotations. This committee is also
concerned with the continued regulation of companies after they have
received a quotation and has responsibility for approving circulars sent
to shareholders. The Quotations Committee members, being ordinary
lay members of the Stock Exchange Council, have no special expert
skills and must rely heavily on the Council's professional staff. This
staff, or "executive organization" of the Council, is broken into four
main departments: Finance, Quotations, House Administration and
Public Relations. The Quotations Department is the counterpart of
the Quotations Committee of the Exchange Council and is responsible
for all aspects of Exchange business dealing with the quoted
companies. The Quotations Department has approximately fifteen

professional staff members. This group includes solicitors and chartered accountants. The quantity and quality of the staff members of the
Quotations Department has increased about twofold in the last few
years, but given the scope of its activities, it still appears to be
inadequate.
2. General Requirements for a Quotation.-The listing requirements of the London Exchange vary according to the method of
offering by the company. In every instance, however, the method of
distribution must be approved by the Quotations Department.6 The
quantity of information that is required to be disclosed, the
extensiveness of the scrutiny by the staff, and the need to publish the
prospectus in the financial press all depend on what kind of security is
being sold and how it is being marketed. The most extensive disclosure
is required for an initial listing when there is a request for a quotation
and the company has no other securities listed. In every such case, a
complete prospectus must be submitted to the Exchange.6 6 If there is
to be a public offering of the securities by an offer for sale, then the
prospectus must also be advertised in the financial press. 6 On the
other hand, if the company is placing the issue or is not distributing a
new issue but only requesting that outstanding securities be quoted,
then, in principle, prior approval must be obtained. If the permission
is granted, the company i required to submit only a small
advertisement that specifies where further information can be obtained.68
65. The Quotations Department of the London Exchange combines activities
found in the United States at the S.E.C. and at the various exchanges. In addition,
it regulates marketing arrangements and other aspects of securities distributions in
a manner that has no counterpart in the United States.
66. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, § A, pt. I, para. 2 (A);
MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59.
67. Id.
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If the company requesting a quotation already has part of its capital
quoted on the London Exchange, the situation changes. If the
securities are identical to currently listed securities, there is no filing
requirement under the Companies Act. The Exchange still requires a
prospectus,6 9 but the information required is considerably less than in
the case of a first quotation for the company. ° If the new securities
are of a different type from those already listed, there may be a
requirement to file under the Companies Act, but the Exchange is
usually willing to grant an exemption if good cause is shown. Rights
offerings are exempted under the Companies Act, but if a quotation is
desired, the Exchange requires that certain information be disclosed
concerning the new securities to be listed. 1 In addition, the Exchange
requires that certain minimum data be forwarded to shareholders,
usually in the form of a letter of notification.72
The rules of the London Exchange require that a final draft of any

required prospectus be submitted to the Exchange fourteen days prior
to publication." In addition, the Exchange requires that in the case
of a public offering, there must be publication of the full prospectus
in two newspapers. The Companies Act,7 4 however, states that no
allotment can be made until three days after the prospectus is issued.
Since the publication required by the London Exchange would by
definition be the day of issue under the Companies Act, there is in
most instances a three day period between the date of publication and
the date of allotment. In practice, the three day period serves to alert
the investor to the offering and gives him an opportunity to obtain a
68. The Exchange is able to grant an exemption from compliance with the
requirements of the Fourth Schedule of the Companies Act. Companies
Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 39. The Exchange will frequently grant this
exemption in the case of introductions and for placements of a new debt security
of a company that already has a quotation for another security. In an offer for
sale or a placement of new common shares, a full prospectus is needed and an
exemption is given only rarely. However, a partial exemption from some of the
disclosure requirements of the Fourth Schedule may be given.

69.

STOCK EXCHANGE RULES,

app. 34, schedule II, pt. B.

70. See note 36 and accompanying text supra (explanations of "prospectus"
and "introduction" offerings).
71. MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at 18.
72. Under current practice, the Exchange does not require that financial
statements be sent to shareholders, but they must at least be informed of the
purposes of the new capital. MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at
18.
73. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, § A, pt. I, para. 2. In practice, the
initial contact with the Exchange takes place well in advance of this time.
74. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 50.
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portion of the allotment. The period thus promotes fairness and gives
all British investors an equal opportunity to obtain a portion of any
new issue in a manner not recognized in the United States. It also
serves as a limited cooling-off period during which the investor can
evaluate the issue.
The prospectus may be shown to investors during the time after its
final draft has been submitted to the Exchange, but before publication. There are no restrictions on the issuing houses or brokers against
contacting investors prior to the time of the advertisement. And since
there is no restriction on obtaining a firm offer to purchase prior to
the time of the advertisement,7" the "gun jumping" problem, as it is
known in the United States, is nonexistent. 6 Normally, this contact
prior to the advertisement would only be made with other brokers and
large institutional investors, but to the extent that it is used, it
provides an extra "waiting period."
3. Regulation of Marketing Arrangements.-The London Stock
Exchange's concern with the method of financing is manifested in
several ways. First, the Exchange has become increasingly committed
to the protection of pre-emptive rights, and only in exceptional
situations will it allow an equity offering to be made by a quoted
company unless the offering takes the form of a rights offering.
Moreover, this must be a true rights offering, rather than a mere open
invitation to shareholders to subscribe. In addition, the Exchange
recently has required that provisions be made for the sale of rights for
the benefit of shareholders who fail to subscribe.
The second major manifestation of the Exchange's concern with the
method of financing deals with the amount of stock available to the
general public and to jobbers. As mentioned earlier, a quotation on
the Exchange is sought for almost all new security issues, even for
relatively small private placements of debt securities. The current
Exchange requirements for a listing of any new issue, including private
placements, is that at least 30 per cent of any class of debt securities
and at least 35 per cent of any class of equity securities be available to
the public."7 Jobbers are entitled to at least 20 per cent of an equity
offering and 25 per cent of any debt offering. The effect of these
requirements is that the relevant percentage amounts must be offered
initially to the public and to jobbers. The requirements are justified on
the grounds that they help "make a market" and provide the public

75. See JENKINS

REPORT, supra note 5, at 371-72.
76. "Gun jumping" refers to the prohibited practice of executing sales or
soliciting offers to buy prior to the effectiveness of the registration statement. 1
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 223-45 (1961).
77. STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 159 (2); id. app. 34.

Winter, 1971

SECURITIES REGULATION IN GREAT BRITAIN

with the opportunity to buy new securities. Of course, they are also a
result of a justifiable self-interest on the part of the Exchange and its
members. Since the Exchange is being asked for a quotation for a
security issue, it is important that there be available a floating supply
of the securities sufficient to maintain a reasonable market. The
jobbers and brokers are able to realize a profit only if there is trading,
and trading cannot take place if an issue is held by only a few large
investors.
If an offering is oversubscribed, the method of allotment preferred
by the London Exchange is a straight pro rata distribution. The

Exchange's concern over fairness in allotment of public offerings is
another instance of an emphasis that is different from that of the
S.E.C. in the United States. The London Exchange's concern has not
been directed particularly at gun jumping and selling pressure on
prospective purchasers, but rather has been upon providing adequate
notice to members of the public so that they may have an equal
opportunity to purchase any allotted shares.
4. Prospectus Formalities Required by the London Stock Exchange.-While no particular form of prospectus is specified by the
London Stock Exchange, the format used in most cases is uniform and
can almost always be printed on a single page of newsprint. At the top
of the sheet in large print is the name of the company and a
description of the securities to be issued. Following this in slightly
smaller print are the names of the directors, brokers, bankers,
auditors, reporting accountants and solicitors. The body of the
prospectus is published in print about one-half the size of normal
newsprint. The material is usually subdivided into the following
headings:
(1) history and business-a description of the real property;
(2) management and staff;
(3) working capital;
(4) statement of profit prospects and dividend policy;
(5) auditor's statement-a summary profit statement for a ten
year period and a summary assets and liabilities statement;
(6) statutory and general information-a history of the capital
structure of the company, provisions in the articles of association
(articles of incorporation) that deal with various shareholder
rights and a summary description of material contracts.
A comparison between the Form S-1, which is the principal form
used by corporations in the United States registering a securities issue
under the 1933 Act, and Schedule IIA,7 8 which contains the
78. There is a great similarity between the disclosure requirements of the
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requirements for a company first seeking a quotation on the London
Stock Exchange, reveals considerable agreement on the main items
that should be disclosed. However, when one compares the actual
information that is disclosed and the requirements that have developed as a matter of practice, the differences are substantial.
5. Comparison Between British and American Prospectus Contents. (a) Description of the Business.-In the United Kingdom, the
description of the business tends to be brief and is stated in general
terms. 9 Apart from the date of incorporation, there is little material
regarding the history or development of the company. Rarely is any
information included concerning competitive aspects of the com-

pany's business or the nature of its customers. By contrast, a
prospectus in the United States must contain a detailed description of
the business and its development over the past five years. In addition,
extensive information is required dealing with the competitive aspects
of the industry within the national economy and with the competitive
position of the particular company within the industry."0 Finally, the
description must include information on the relative importance of
the various products of the company and on the nature and
importance of major customers.8 1
(b) Description of Property.-In Great Britain, the description of
the company's property is simply a short factual description of the
various premises either owned or held under long-term lease. The
purpose of the description is deemed to be in assisting a potential
investor to ascertain the company's size and principal products.82 In
the United States, the description of property must relate to the
nature of the business 3 and sufficient information must be given so
that the investor can judge "suitability, adequacy, productive capacity
and extent of utilization of facilities used in production."'
This
description of property must be consistent with the statement made
regarding the competitive position of the company in the American
economy.

Companies Act and the Stock Exchange. E.g., compare Companies Act of 1948,

11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 37-46 with STOCK ExCHANGE RULES, app. 34,
schedule II, pt. A.
79. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule I, pt. A, para. 15.
80. Form S-1, item 9.
81. Form S-1, item 9.
82. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, para. 16 (ii).
83. Form S-1, item 10.
84. Form S-1, item 10, instruction 1.
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(c) Remuneration of Directors.-In Great Britain, details are
required of each service agreement between directors and the quoted
company, together with details of each commission arrangement. A
single figure may be given for the aggregate 8" emolument paid to the
directors as a group. In the United States, aggregate remuneration
must be given for both officers and directors, and individual
remuneration must be given for all directors and the three highest paid
officers who receive in excess of 30,000 dollars.86 In addition,
information is required on all retirement or pension benefits payable
to officers or directors and on all stock options or stock purchase or
bonus plans.8 7
(d) Specific Investor Warnings.-While in the United States the
prospectus generally is designed to provide full public disclosure rather
than investor protection, certain aspects of the presentation of
prospectus material required by the S.E.C. are for the benefit of the
relatively unsophisticated investor. When a company is publicly
offering its securities for the first time, the S.E.C. will frequently insist
that the prospectus contain an introductory paragraph that summarizes various speculative aspects of the issue. Such a warning
paragraph may be required because of the absence of an operating
history, the current financial position of the company, or the nature
of the enterprise. Also, the S.E.C. often will require a company to
spell out, in simplified terms, information that is available elsewhere in
a more complex form. For example, when a company has issued
options for cheap stock or convertible stock, it may be required to
specify the price of such stock to the persons receiving it, compared to
the price to a new investor and the extent of the diluting effect on the
investor's purchase. In Great Britain, all material contracts and
security sales within the two years preceeding the time of distribution88 must be described in order that an investor theoretically can
calculate the price of his stock, compared to the price paid by
promoters or early investors. Since so many changes of capital take
place immediately before a company goes to market, however, this is
apt to be a difficult and complex procedure.

85. STOCK

EXCHANGE RULES,

app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, para. 21 (v).

The Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 8, requires the listing of employees earning
in excess of £10,000 and a disclosure of any service contracts between the
company and its directors.
86. Form S-1, item 17 (a) (1).
87. Form S-1, item 17, instruction 5, para. 6.
88. See Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, Fourth Schedule, pt.
I, item 6.
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(e) Financial Information.-The greatest disparity between the
prospectus requirements of the London Exchange and those of the
S.E.C. is in the extent of the financial information disclosed. Neither
the London Exchange nor the Companies Act of 1948 requires much
detailed information in the profit and loss statement of the prospectus.89 In practice, a single figure is given for group profits before

taxation and the amount deducted for depreciation. Sales data usually
are not included. Recently, the London Exchange has requested that
turnover (sales) be specified in the prospectus, but this has not been
rigorously enforced. Moreover, the 1967 amendments to the Companies Act require that turnover be disclosed in the annual account,
and it is generally expected that more information will appear in
future prospectuses.9" At present, however, breakdowns disclosing
the cost of goods sold, together with operating and administrative
expenses, are not required and are rarely given.9 1 In addition, the
89. Statement of Adjustments is required from accountants by the Exchange,
but is not a part of the prospectus. See STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34,
schedule II, pt. A, item 21; MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at 12,
item 7 Statement of Adjustments (Statement of Retained Earnings and Income
Statement contain somewhat more information on sales).
90. Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 17, schedule 2, par. 13A. The STOCK
EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, item 17, simply states that a
sales turnover figure should be given "wherever possible."
91. The following would be a typical breakdown of the income statement of a
United States manufacturing firm:
Sales
Sale returns and allowances
Sale discounts
Net Sales
Cost of goods sold (separate statement)
Materials
Labor
Overhead
Indirect Labor
Utilities
Repairs
Supplies
Insurance
Payroll tax
Depreciation
Gross Profit on Sales
Selling general and after expenses
Net Operating Income
Other Income & Expense
Net Income
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profit and loss statement usually does not include information on
non-operating income, such as investment income, or data on such
expenses as interest, amortization of debt and the handling of deferred
and current taxation.
There is no requirement in the United Kingdom that critical data be
disclosed in the balance sheet of the prospectus. For example, the
balance sheet does not include an analysis of current assets that
specifies accounts receivable and reserve for bad debts. There is also
no requirement under the London Exchange rules for a description of
inventories or the method of evaluation. The fixed assets usually are
not designated by categories with a separate depreciation analysis.

Likewise, there is rarely a breakdown in current liabilities, such as
accounts payable, trade, accrued expenses, taxes and long-term debt
within a year. A financial analyst would find it quite difficult to make
a meaningful analysis of a company on the basis of this limited
financial information, and in particular, to judge the effectiveness of
the utilization of assets with respect to production.
(f) Extra Information.-The prospectus requirements of the London Stock Exchange include items of two types that would not
ordinarily be found in a prospectus in the United States. First, a
prospectus in the United Kingdom must include a description of
various items in the articles of incorporation that affect shareholders'
rights.92 Typical provisions that would be disclosed are those relating
to borrowing power of directors; the ability of a director to be part of
a quorum or to vote in directors' and shareholders' meetings upon
matters in which the directors have a personal interest; mandatory
retirement and share ownership provisions for directors; and quorum
and majority requirements in shareholder voting. 3 In the United
States, the only item of this type that must be disclosed is that
94
concerning indemnification of directors and officers.
The other prospectus item that is required in Great Britain but that
has no counterpart under the 1933 Securities Act is the requirement
of directors' opinions concerning the sufficiency of working capital
and the company's profit and dividend prospects. 95 The statement on

92. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule I, pt. A, item 12.
93. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, items 12 (i), (ii)
& (iii).
94. Form S-1, item 29. It may be that there is an even greater need in the

United States to require certain aspects of the articles of incorporation or by-laws
to be highlighted in the prospectus, due to the important differences that exist in
state incorporation acts. These differences in state acts relate not only to the
items mentioned above, but also to other areas such as dividend restrictions,
cumulative voting and pre-emptive rights.
95. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, item 19.
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working capital must be supported by a letter from the sponsoring
brokers or some other third party, such as the merchant bank that
advises the company. These two statements in the prospectus
probably cause more concern to the company and its solicitors and
issuing houses than any other required information. Such directors'
opinions are not only omitted from the prospectus requirements in
the United States, but they are expressly prohibited from being
included in the prospectus.9 6 The financial community in England
believes that these predictions are extremely important. The broker of
the issuer (known colloquially as the company's broker), the issuing
house, and the solicitor, as well as the company's directors, all have an
interest in insuring that the predictions are reasonable. The general

impression is that the predicted profits and dividends are conservative,
and it is an exceptional case when a company does not meet its
predicted dividends during the first year. As mentioned earlier, British
investors, until recently, have tended to buy for income rather than
for capital gain; thus, the predicted dividend is one of the most
important selling items in the prospectus. In addition, since relatively
little information is disclosed to British investors via the prospectus,
these predictions are crucial in attempting to formulate meaningful
investment decisions.
6. Disclosure Requirements Other Than at the Time of Obtaining
the Original Listing.-In the United States, prospectus requirements
for subsequent issues of securities of a particular company are
generally the same as the requirements for the first public issue of that
company. The requirements are also the same for securities issues
directed to the existing shareholders of a company-rights offeringsand, unless specially exempted, for share-for-share transfers as well.
The London Stock Exchange, however, has a short form prospectus
for companies that have part of their capital already quoted on the
Exchange. In addition there are no formal prospectus requirements for
rights offerings, share-for-share transfers,9 7 stock-option or stockpurchase plans directed to employees.
In the United States, a company files a registration statement only
for the quantity of securities involved in the immediate distribution;
each new distribution requires a new registration. The New York
Stock Exchange grants a listing only for those securities which are
currently outstanding. On the other hand, the London Stock

96. See JENKINS

REPORT, supra note 5, at 14, 65; and WHEAT REPORT,

supra note 52, at 95-96. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666 (Feb. 7,

1964), item 10.
97. However, the Take-Over Bid Code would apply to some aspects of this
situation.
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Exchange usually gives both a quotation and permission to deal for all
authorized shares of the company at the time of initial distribution.9"
Once a quotation is obtained, subsequent sales of the same class of
securities may be made by the company through the market. There
are no London Exchange rules governing even a large block of stock in
a secondary offering or offerings by control persons 9 The Exchange,
however, does exercise some control over rights offerings and
share-for-share stock transfers through its regulation of circulars.' 00
For instance, one of the general undertakings of all quoted companies
is that they send to the Department of Quotations of the London
Stock Exchange all circulars sent to shareholders. The London
Exchange also insists that certain minimum information be disclosed
to shareholders in the letter of notification which is sent to announce
a rights offering.' 01 Although there are no formal requirements, the
Exchange usually requests a statement from the issuing company's
board of directors regarding the purpose of the capital that is being
raised and an opinion that the money received will be sufficient to
accomplish that purpose. Current financial statements and other

information on the company are normally not included.

02

7. Extent of Scrutiny.-An evaluation of the extent and depth of
scrutiny by the London Stock Exchange of the submitted material is
difficult, but there is general agreement that the Exchange is taking a
more active role now than ever before. A draft of the prospectus
usually is submitted to the Quotations Department several weeks prior
to the time of the offering. Comments frequently are made by the
Quotations Department and revised drafts are then resubmitted by the
company. In addition to its own staff, the Quotations Department
occasionally makes use of outside accountants and solicitors. The
involvement of outside accountants is usually related to a particular

98. MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at 4.
99. In Great Britain, neither the Companies Act nor the Exchange rules raise
problems of secondary offerings. This means that none of the questions regarding
sales by control persons or statutory underwriters encountered in the United
States are raised.
100. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. B, item 9. See
also MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at 7, para. 18. The authority
to control circulars stems from the Prevention of Fraud Act of 1958.
101. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. B, item 8. Note
also, that if newly authorized shares are involved the Exchange can control the
rights offering through its discretion in granting a quotation for the new shares.
102. The Stock Exchange usually requires that the rights be offered nil-paid,
and the shareholders be given the opportunity to renounce the rights and sell
them. Rights are usually traded from 15 to 21 days.
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industry problem. In the last few years, for instance, it has often used
outside real estate appraisers as consultants in connection with real
property companies. The actual scrutiny and investigation is done by
the professional staff of the Quotations Department. Once a prospectus has been approved by the Department, rarely will the Quotations
Committee or Council members themselves question any aspect of it.
Typically, the Council is involved only to negotiate or arbitrate
requests by the issuer for a relaxation of the Exchange's requirements.
The scrutiny of the staff of the London Stock Exchange consists
primarily in checking to see that all of the Exchange's requirements
have been fulfilled. The Exchange does not pass on the veracity of the
statements made, but rather concerns itself with checking the
documents submitted for omissions and obvious inconsistencies. In this
respect, its performance is similar to that of the S.E.C. The S.E.C.,
however, is more rigorous in the application of its standards. If the
S.E.C. writes a deficiency letter after reviewing a prospectus, it will
comment that certain material is misleading, ask for information to be
expressed in a different manner, or ask for additional information to
be disclosed. This kind of substantive evaluation is done only to a

limited extent by the London Exchange. Additionally, the S.E.C.
frequently asks that back-up reports and studies made by investment
bankers be submitted in confidence for its own use, while the London
Exchange rarely makes such requests. The London Exchange normally
relies upon the presumption that an issuing house has made a
thorough independent study of the issuer and would not distribute the
security unless it had done so. Also, while the S.E.C. demands
extensive disclosure of the speculative aspects of an issue, there are no
extra disclosure requirements imposed by the London Exchange for
new or promotional companies.' 03
The staff of the S.E.C. will often challenge factual statements made
in a prospectus, based upon their knowledge of the particular industry
or of activities of similar companies. The staff of the London
Exchange is not equipped to make this challenge, nor would such a
challenge be considered proper except in the case of a flagrant
violation. The S.E.C. requires more information to be disclosed in areas
such as the nature of the competition, the description of the business
and properties, the material interests of the directors and promoters,
and the notes supplementing the financial statements. For this reason
the average prospectus in the United States is two to three times
103. A few promotional companies have obtained a listing in recent years.
Examples are companies involving earnings of entertainers. There is interest in the
financial community in opening up access to the Exchange to newer, more
speculative offerings.
Winter, 1971

SECURITIES REG ULA TION IN GREAT BRITAIN

longer than the English prospectus; moreover, this extra material is
primarily descriptive and, therefore, more subject to challenge.
An examination of the published prospectuses of several securities
issues during the period from 1966 to 1968 reveals that the London
Exchange has not been particularly strict in enforcing its own
requirements. For example, the Exchange regulations call for the
disclosure of turnover or gross trading income during the three years
preceding the issue whenever possible. In spite of this requirement,
actual turnover figures were usually not given. 1" 4 In many instances,
the expression of turnover has been allowed merely in terms of
percentage increase over prior years. This makes it impossible to
determine actual sales or cost of sales. 1 Os The description of the
business .is supposed to include a breakdown of information on profits
and losses as well as assets in each of the major activities or divisions

of the company.

Turnover figures are supposed to contain a

breakdown between the important trading activities. Nonetheless,
these breakdowns usually are not given in any form, and if present, are
in such general terms that they are of little use. Similarly, a separate
requirement for geographical breakdown of assets and profits is often
ignored or expressed in general terms; a country-by-country designation is rarely given. It is reported, however, that the Exchange has
recently been enforcing these requirements more rigorously.
The Exchange requirements mentioned above all go beyond
requirements in the Companies Act. But the Exchange as a self-regulatory structure has been reluctant to move too far beyond current
industry practice. The Exchange is aware that relatively few companies disclose this information and thus is reluctant to enforce
disclosures at the time of a distribution when it may prejudice a
company in its competitive position. Furthermore, the Council of the
London Exchange is subject to great pressures. Some investors and
members of the financial press continually work for greater activity by
the London Exchange and for new direct government regulation.' 06
Others, including most issuing houses, are strongly opposed to new
regulation from any source, including the Exchange. Brokers and
104. Disclosure of turnover is now required in the annual account.
Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 17, schedule 2, para. 13A. However, the extent
of detail required if such a disclosure appears in a prospectus remains an open
question.
105. It also limits other ratio analyses: sales related to stockholders equity
(rate of issuance); net sales related to operating expenses (operating ratio); sales
related to fixed assets; and inventory usage.
106. See, e.g., H. ROSE, DISCLOSURE IN COMPANY ACCOUNTS, Criticism of Disclosure (2d ed. 1965).
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issuing houses alike profit from increased quotations and are reluctant
to make the listing process more complex.' 07 Those who argue for

more regulation in order to increase investor confidence encounter
arguments based on the immediate short-term burden on companies
and their advisers. It is perhaps indicative that there is a discrepancy
between the Exchange's own view of the extent of its disclosure
regulation, and the issuing houses' and solicitors' view of the same
regulation. The Exchange states that it closely checks and thoroughly
scrutinizes materials submitted; the issuing houses and solicitors say,
however, that the scrutiny has not been particularly close. They
believe that the Exchange relies primarily on the reputation of the
issuing house and broker that sponsors the issue. While the issuing
houses, brokers and solicitors recognize this reliance by the Exchange,
they generally take the position that their primary client in distribution of securities is the company rather than the investors. In case of
conflict, they normally negotiate on behalf of the issuing company.
The typical prospectus in the United States tends to be schizophrenic. It contains extensive detail designed to satisfy the financial
analyst and expert, and yet is written in a manner designed to put the
small, unsophisticated investor on guard. The typical British prospectus is weak in both respects. Financial analysts are dissatisfied with the
extent of information and the prospectus contains much less than its
American counterpart in the way of warnings for the unsophisticated
investor. The London Exchange does not require a company "to do
the sums" for the investor. For example, in the United Kingdom a
prospectus usually discusses profits and dividends in terms of a
percentage of capital, as stated in the articles of incorporation--an
arbitrary and relatively worthless statistic. For many English investors,
the most important single item is the yield based on the price of the
shares to the investor. Yet until quite recently, the yield was rarely
given in the prospectus and was usually left to be calculated by the
investor.
It is commonly stated that institutional as well as individual
investors in the United Kingdom read the prospectus only to
determine the names of the directors, the issuing house, the broker
and the predicted yield. The attitude of the London Exchange, as
reflected in its review of prospectuses, indicates that it is also more
concerned with the men behind the issue than with the detail
disclosed in the prospectus.

107. An increasing number of brokers and jobbers are reported to be
pressuring the Council for more rigorous enforcement of Exchange regulations
and urging fellow members to take a long-term view.
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8. DirectRegulations.-The London Exchange does not distinguish
between its role in supervising adequate disclosure and its role in the
direct regulation of a company's activities. Part of the difficulty in
comparing the systems of securities regulation in the United Kingdom
and the United States is the close interplay of these two roles of the
London Exchange. In making any appraisal, it is necessary to separate
the question of the effectiveness of the regulations in preventing fraud
and investor loss, as opposed to the effectiveness of the regulations in
promoting financial markets and facilitating their function of channeling capital into the most effective enterprises. It is obvious that these
goals are not completely separate, since protection of investors leads
to investor confidence and better markets. Yet it is also true that
certain types of regulation have a more limited overall effect on the
operation of the securities market.
The London Exchange is reluctant to acknowledge its role in direct
regulation. It does not want to appear to be a policeman of corporate
behavior or a guarantor of quoted securities. Nonetheless, the London
Exchange engages in direct regulation of various forms. First, the
Exchange insists that the corporate structure and material contracts
do not impinge on certain minimum rights of shareholders. The
articles of incorporation of listed companies must contain certain
prescribed provisions that are designed to offer to the shareholder
such minimum protection. In addition, the Exchange will challenge
specific articles, by-laws, or long-term contracts that appear to be
unfair to the company or to shareholders. For example, a company
recently seeking an Exchange listing had provisions in several
long-term service contracts which effectively prevented shareholders
from removing directors from office. It was not enough for the
company to disclose the provisions; the Exchange insisted that they be
changed. In another case, the Exchange challenged corporate by-laws

that resulted in an executive committee of directors having a veto
action over the vote of the full board of directors. In this manner, the
Exchange preserved the traditional division of rights and powers
between shareholders, directors and management. To a limited
extent, the major stock exchanges in the United States exercise similar
control.'08
The second form of direct regulation by the London Exchange is
the role it plays as the conscience of the financial community. This
regulation is informal and consequently more difficult to assess.
Exchange officials constantly stress their reliance on solicitors, issuing

108. For example, the New York Stock Exchange will not list non-voting
stock.
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houses, brokers and accountants. This reliance extends beyond
insuring disclosure. The Exchange apparently relies on these participants for such items as: insuring the truth of any statements made;

insuring a fair price for securities and preventing unreasonable dilution
for new investors; preventing incompetents or individuals with poor
reputations from being in a management position; restricting compensation to promoters and control persons; and preventing false markets
and insider trading. Moreover, the Exchange requires that the
accountant submit letters to the Exchange which are partly statements
of fact and partly statements of opinion. 9 Yet the Exchange does
not second-guess a company or issuing house on the price of an
offering; it believes competitive factors alone should decide this
matter. In addition, the Exchange does not solicit from a company
information that it is expected to hold in confidence." 0 In spite of
this, the Exchange does prod the other segments of the financial
community to exercise an active role in investor protection. At the
same time, it provides them with a rationale for their dealings with
clients.
The S.E.C. and the exchanges in the United States serve this same
function, but to a much lesser extent. With few exceptions, the
emphasis is directed toward disclosure and there is little S.E.C.
pressure that would prompt a company to change its corporate
structure or limit executive compensation. The London Exchange
maintains a much more active "rogues gallery" than anything
comparable in the United States. If the London Exchange believes
that an individual who is proposed as a director or officer has a poor
reputation, informal pressure will force his removal.' ' ' It is also
important to note that the London Exchange has occasionally refused
to grant a listing solely on the basis of the quality of the issue.
Although exchanges in the United States also refuse listings based on

quality, the effect of denying a listing in Great Britain is virtually to
prevent the company from selling securities to the public.
109. MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE, supra note 59, at 14, para. 13. The
role of the accountant is discussed in detail pp. 91-97 infra. In general, it can
be stated that the London Exchange relies heavily on the opinions of the auditor
and considers him the most important key to investor protection.
110. Recently, the S.E.C. has requested internal memos prepared by
undenwriters. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666, supra note 96, at item
25.
111. This gallery has been described in various interviews, and is frequently
mentioned in descriptions of the operation of the City. See, e.g., JENKINS
REPORT, supra note 5, Minutes of Committee; A. MERRETT, M. HOWE & G.
NEWBOULD, EQUITY ISSUES AND THE LONDON CAPITAL MARKET 15
(1967).
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The final form of direct regulation is the London Exchange's
requirement that every company seeking a quotation be sponsored by
a broker who is a member of the Exchange. This may be a hold-over
from the club concept of the Exchange: a new securities issue, like a
new member, must have a sponsor to vouch for its reputation. The
Exchange normally deals with a company through its broker. The
Exchange attempts to build a continuing responsibility in the broker
and has used the original sponsoring broker to contact a company in
matters concerning trading problems and approval of circulars. In the
original negotiations concerning the nature of the offering and the
content of the prospectus, the formal contact is with the broker, and
he usually acts as intermediary between the issuing house or solicitor

and the Quotations Department. If matters become complicated and
discussion prolonged, or if time becomes critical, negotiations take
place directly with the company. This direct contact by a non-broker
is a matter of privilege, not of right. The Exchange considers it an
important aspect of its regulation that a broker, a member of the
Exchange, has a direct responsibility for every company and every
issue in which there is a quotation.1 12
D. Other Regulatory Restrictions on Security Issuance
1. Bank of England.-Under the Borrowing Act of 1946, the
British Treasury has authority to restrict all issues of stock and debt
securities unless they have received prior consent of the government.1 1 3 The purpose of regulation under that Act is two-fold: to
restrict foreign security issues in order to protect the British balance
of payments; and to control the timing of domestic issues. To
effectuate this broad scheme, the regulations extend not only to
matters of timing, but also to the amount borrowed and the terms of
the debt issue. 1 14

112. Members of the London Exchange themselves admit that there are great
differences between brokers in how seriously they take their responsibility. One
member candidly reported, ...... a company can always find some broker who is
prepared to sell his soul for a fee."
113. Borrowing (Control and Guarantees) Act of 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 58.
Under this authority the Treasury issued the Control of Borrowing Order of 1958,
STAT. INSTR. 1958, No. 1208, as amended, Control of Borrowing (Amendment)
Order of 1959, STAT. INSTR. 1959, No. 445, and Control of Borrowing
(Amendment) Order of 1967, STAT. INSTR. 1967, No. 69.
114. Permission may be given but the amount cut. For example, Australia
recently requested permission to sell £20 million worth of bonds, but authority
was granted to sell £10 million.
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The Treasury has delegated its regulatory power under the
Borrowing Act of 1946 to the Bank of England.' 15 In their
application to foreign borrowers, the regulations require the consent
of the Bank of England whenever non-resident persons, including
governments, request to raise capital either through an issue of
securities denominated in sterling, or a direct borrowing in sterling,
such as a bank loan. Under current practice, borrowing of this nature
is severely restricted. Consent is given to residents of Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Republic only in situations which

promise an early, substantial and continuing benefit to Britain's
balance of payments.' 1 6 Consent for borrowing by residents of less
developed sterling area countries is easier to obtain, but consent is
rarely given to non-sterling or non-Commonwealth countries. The
Bank of England considers blue chip foreign government issues to be
in active competition with issues of the British and local governments
and is concerned with any activity that increases the cost of domestic
security issues.
Permission under the Borrowing Act is no longer required for
foreign borrowing in non-sterling currency. This means that international dollar bonds by foreign governments or companies need not be
given specific permission. Of course, all investments in non-sterling
currency are subject to general exchange controls and must be
pool of investment securities known as
purchased through the
"investment dollars."' '1 7
The extent of control over domestic issues depends on the identity
of the borrower. The Bank of England has authority to regulate both
the terms and timing of all securities issued or guaranteed by the
British Government, a local authority or a nationalized industry.' 18
This power to regulate extends to all aspects of the securities involved,
including the amount that is issued, the rate and life of the security,
the coupon rate, the amount of discount and the premium. The Bank
115. See note 113 supra. A Capital Issues Committee was also established.
116. Bank of England announcement of May 3, 1966.
117. Exchange Control Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14. The premium for
investment dollars has been in the range of 15 to 25%. As a matter of practice, the
Bank of England gives permission to merchant banks to trade in international
bond issues without the requirement that it be done with investment dollars. This
is done to aid the financial community in maintaining its active role in
underwriting and trading in these securities. The argument is made that
commissions obtained by the merchant banks help the balance of payments. The
Bank of England does not believe that any significant amount of international
bonds is actually taken up in England.
118. See Trustee Investment Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 62, schedule 1,
pt. II, § § 1-5.
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of England's primary concern is whether the financial market will
absorb the securities at reasonable terms,' 1 9 and the Bank relates all
its decisions to the needs of the national government. In its
regulatory capacity, the Bank has placed severe limitations on the
access to British securities markets by other gilt-edged securities that
the Bank believes may compete with the various government
securities. The waiting time, or queue, for long-term local bonds has
recently run as long as seven to eight years. Within this general
scheme, some issues are given priority. For example, issues by the
Greater London Council are released prior to other local issues and
short-term issues, i.e., two to three years, usually can move in on a
separate list with almost no waiting. Furthermore, maturing issues are
generally given priority in order to enable renewal on approximately
similar terms.
The Bank of England has direct authority to regulate only the
timing, and not the terms, of private corporate debt issues. In practice,
the actual timing of domestic corporate debt issues is handled through
the government broker, a senior member of the London Stock
Exchange, who receives a request for an issue date several months
prior to the anticipated issue.1 2 0 While the Bank claims to control
only the timing of an issue, the real goal is to spread out the issues
entering the market in a manner sufficient to serve as an indirect
regulation of the cost of capital. By this system, the Bank seeks to
prevent fluctuation in the cost of government and corporate borrowing. If there were no government control of timing, the terms would
be established by the competitive pressure in the market. To the
extent that corporate bonds compete with government bonds, the
self-interest of the government dictates low rates and the queue
system appears to be directed to this end. During the past several
years, the queue for corporate bonds has ranged from three months to
over a year. There was no queue for ordinary shares during the same
period because there had been a general dearth of equity issues in the
market during the prior few years. One effect of the queue system is
to discourage corporate use of the securities markets because of the
uncertainty and delay. But some argue that since the queue usually
causes delay only in fixed interest financing, it encourages corporations to issue equity securities. There is, however, little evidence to
support this hypothesis.
119. These bonds are given priority over the blue chip overseas Commonwealth government issues.
120. The significant date is that of the "impact time," rather than the closing
date. The impact date is the date of the underwriting and pre-placing effort, and is
usually a week to ten days prior to the actual subscription date.
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In weak and undeveloped securities markets, a queue can be
justified simply as a device to stabilize large fluctuations in the price
of securities. In the relatively sophisticated British securities market,
however, a queue for corporate securities issues appears detrimental to
the dual goals of encouraging corporate investment and promoting the
role of the securities market as a source of funds. By contrast, the
United States has no direct control over access to its securities market.
Securities issues of states and local authorities are virtually free of any
regulation and they openly compete with federal and corporate
bonds.' I1 Foreign borrowers are restrained by the interest equalization tax, but this is more a form of exchange control for balance of
payment purposes than an attempt to control the timing, interest rates
or terms of a debt issue. Indirectly, however, the United States
Federal Government influences supply and demand in the American
securities market by such means as its monetary policies, the activities
of the Federal Reserve Board, fixing margin levels, setting discount
rates and conducting open market operations.
Aside from its direct control, the Bank of England plays no other
role in regulating securities issues.' 2 2 It has no authority to check the
prospectus of any issue with respect to disclosure requirements. Apart
from consultations with the government broker, the Bank has
relatively little direct contact with the London Exchange, although
the Exchange occasionally may call upon the Bank's economic
intelligence department for information and statistical data concerning
a particular individual or company.
2. Issuing Houses.-It is frequently said that the most effective
regulation of new securities issues is done by the issuing houses.' 2 3 In
the Jenkins Committee Report, the role of the issuing house in
investor protection was described as follows: "Reference should also
be made to the part played by the Issuing Houses through whom most
new issues of any importance reach the public, and who are concerned
for their own credit to see that proper standards are maintained."' 2' 4
There are no statutory provisions for the activities of the issuing
houses. There is not even a single definition for the term, "issuing

121. In the United States, municipal bonds are given an indirect subsidy by
the government in that they are tax free to the investor.
122. The Bank of England does play a role, however, in the regulation of
issuing houses, in granting licensing exemptions and in administering the
Take-Over Bid Code.
123. See R. PENNINGTON, supra note 6, at 198. He comments that the
backing of an issuing house in the sale of a security will decidedly affect investor
confidence and in the case of small or unknown companies is a virtual necessity.
124. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at § 225.
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house." In practice, it is used to describe both a type of merchant

bank2 I and a type of business activity performed. In the case of the
latter definition, the reference is to the functions of underwriting,
marketing and arranging for a security issue-the term "sponsoring
the issue" is used in the vernacular of the financial community. The
two definitional concepts become confused in that the activity of an
issuing house will vary depending on the type of security offering. For
example, in both rights offerings and private placements the services
of an issuing house may not be used at all, and in every such case, they
are used to a lesser degree than in public offerings. Recently, there
have been numerous offerings to the public that have taken place
without using any services of a merchant bank. A broker, solicitor or
some other individual may perform the financial functions of an
issuing house.1 26 In most instances, however, when securities are
being offered to the public, one of the large merchant banks that is a
member of the Issuing House Association will perform some function
in the offering.

The major merchant banks are often financial advisers to the
company that they represent since they have a long-term and
continuing interest in the company. In most instances, they also
recognize an implied responsibility to the investing public and realize
that the London Exchange looks to them to assume some regulatory
role. There is little agreement among the issuing houses, however, on
the extent of this role. Usually the issuing house itself does the initial
drafting of the prospectus. It is then carefully checked by one of the
large firms of solicitors. In addition, the issuing house is usually the
negotiator between the company and the London Exchange, although
formal contact is made through the company broker.
The regulatory function performed by the issuing house in a
securities offering in Great Britain is comparable to that performed by
a major investment banking or brokerage house acting as an
underwriter in the United States. In both countries, the underwriter

has two sets of clients: the company that is attempting to raise capital
and the underwriter's investor clientele. The underwriter's responsibility is to protect the interests of both. The primary incentive of the
underwriter, however, is self-interest; it does not wish to have its name
attached to an issue that is not successful. It realizes that its future
success depends in large part on the satisfaction of the investors with
125. There are 56 members of the Issuing House Association of which 16 are

clearing house banks. It is reported that 7 merchant banks do over 50% of all new
issues. A. MERRETT, M. HowE & G. NEWBOULD, supra note 111, at 23.
126. Cazenone & Co. is reported handling more issues than any other issuing
NEWBOULD,Supra note 111, at 26.

house. A. MERRETT, M. HOWE & G.
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whom it deals. The underwriter must thoroughly investigate the
company before it can offer advice on financing and must present a

plan that is reasonable to both the company and the investors. The
underwriter acts to protect his own interests, and to the extent these
interests coincide with those of the investing public, the underwriter
performs an indirect but indispensable role in protecting the interests

of the investing public.
It is difficult to find any tangible basis of regulation by issuing
houses beyond this self-interest. The Issuing Houses Association is a
very loose-knit association and, aside from its participation in the
Code controlling take-over bids, it does not purport to set standards
for its members or to serve as a self-regulatory body.1 2 7 It is basically
a trade association that both provides a forum for the discussion of

common problems and represents its members to the public. 1 2 8
The extent of independent investigation by an issuing house in
connection with a new security issue is subject to significant variation
depending on many factors, including the extent of the prior
relationship between the issuing house and the company. Recently,
some issuing houses have insisted on an independent set of accounts
prepared by their own accountants and have instituted formal
procedures to obtain information from the company and its staff. The
procedures usually include inspections both by members of the issuing
house and by outside experts. In some instances, however, it is
reported that issuing houses work only on the basis of information
reported to them by the company, and several issuing houses have
expressed concern over the caliber of work done by some of their
competitors. The London Exchange is aware of differences in the
quality of the independent investigation by an issuing house; the
Exchange apparently adjusts the amount of its own scrutiny of a new
securities issue in relation to the level of confidence it has in the
particular issuing house involved.

There are also those who are concerned about the dramatic increase
in competition between merchant banks and believe it has brought a
lowering of standards. This concern is based on the fear that if issuing
houses are too rigorous, they may lose clients to less scrupulous
competitors. Indeed, it does appear that rarely is a corporation turned
down by an issuing house, and it is generally believed that a company
can always find someone who will handle its offering and application

127. The Issuing House Association is clearly not a self-regulatory body in the
sense of the London Stock Exchange or the Institute of Chartered Accountants.

128. The Association has become more active in connection with the
Take.Over Bid Code.
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for a quotation. Merchant banks that are the primary issuing houses
have become more oriented to a role of corporate adviser. Their major
activity in this respect is the selling of financial advice and services in
connection with mergers, take-over bids and general matters of
corporate policy. This orientation, coupled with the greater size and
heterogeneity of the investing community, perhaps has resulted in
merchant banks identifying their interests more closely with their
corporate clients than with the investing public. Moreover, individual
merchant bankers in firms are often company directors. The presence
of such people on the board of directors may be beneficial to the
company, but it creates an inherent conflict of interests for the

merchant banks when they are acting as underwriters. It also seriously
affects the ability of the firm to offer an independent source of
129
investor protection.
Issuing houses and their counterparts in the United States perform a
valuable role in investor protection. Contrary to a frequently stated
view, this role does not appear to be greater in Great Britain than in
the United States. Particular firms in both countries maintain high
standards. No investment banker or underwriter wants to be associated with an unsuccessful financing venture for a company. In both
countries, however, there is a significant variation in standards among
issuing houses and in neither country should too much reliance be
placed on the institutional role of an issuing house or underwriter
apart from the particular issuing house's reputation.
3. The Accounting Profession.-The accounting profession in
Great Britain plays a role in securities regulation that in many respects
129. In this connection it is enlightening to contrast the testimony of the
representatives of the Issuing House Association before the Jenkins Committee
with that of members of the London Stock Exchange. Apparently, the sole
concern of the issuing houses' representatives was to protect corporations from
further regulation. They were opposed to any regulation of non-voting shares or
pre-emptive rights, both of which were supported by the London Exchange as a
matter of investor protection. The issuing house members also testified that there
was no need for any new investor protection or prospectus requirements in rights
offerings or share-for-share transfers. The attitude of those testifying can be
summarized by two statements: (1) that in rights offerings and share-for-share
transfers an investor is sufficiently protected if he follows the advice of his
directors; and (2) "I think the point is we cannot do it [provide investor
protection] by legislation, but the force of city opinion and financial advice can
judge in individual cases." JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 353 (statement on
pre-emptive rights), 357 (statement on Exchange offerings), 359 (statement on
non-voting shares), 366 (statement on investor protection). On these items, the
views of the issuing houses contrasted not only with those of the London Stock

Exchange but also with the Financial Analysts Association.
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is broader and more influential than in the United States. The
Companies Act requires certified accounts to be filed annually and
certified financial statements to be included in the prospectus prior to
a new security offering.1 30 To be qualified to give a certification
under the Companies Act, an auditor must be licensed either by the
Board of Trade or by a member of a body of accountants recognized
by the Board of Trade. 1 The London Stock Exchange also requires
certified financial statements prior to granting a quotation.' 32 The
Exchange relies heavily on the formal certification of the accountant
and, in addition, requires various letters of opinion from accountants
to augment the certification. In a less formal but equally important
function, accountants provide reports that border on investment
advice to issuing houses, brokers and other members of the financial
community.
In contrast to the, officially recognized functions of British
accountants, there is relatively little direct regulation of the
accountants themselves. Membership in the four recognized accounting bodies in the United Kingdom is similar to membership in the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (A.I.C.P.A.) in the
United States, but Great Britain has no counterpart to the licensing
requirements that exist in every state in the United States. The only
statutory controls on accountants are those contained in the Companies Act in connection with serving as an auditor for a registered
company. 33 The Board of Trade exercises no authority or restriction
130. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 124-29, 147-63;
Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, §§ 3-12; INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, THE ACCOUNTANCY PROFESSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE

21 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ACCOUNTANCY].
131. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 17. The general accountancy
bodies in the United Kingdom which are recognized by the Board of Trade for the
purposes of the Companies Act are: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales; The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland; and the
Institute of Certified and Corporate Accountants. See also PROFESSIONAL
ACCOUNTING IN 25 COUNTRIES, ch. 19, at 10 (1964); K. SMITH & D.
KEENAN, COMPANY LAW 139 (1966).
132. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, item 21.
133. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 5 & 7. Most actual regulation of
accountants in the United States is in the form of self-regulation. While the C.P.A.
certificates are issued by each state, the examination and standards are set by the
A.I.C.P.A. In effect, it is the A.I.C.P.A. that issues the certificates while the states

license practice in that state if one passes the Uniform C.P.A. Examination.
There are minor differences in the extent of the examination from state to state,
but not in the content.
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over the accounting bodies that it has recognized. There are no
officially designated educational, ethical or accounting practice
standards. Rather, each recognized body sets up minimum standards
1 34
for entrance into the profession and general ethical standards.
The certification of the financial statement that is required under
the Companies Act must deal expressly with the following matters.
(1) whether, as auditors, the certifying parties have obtained all
the information that they deem necessary for their audit;
(2) whether proper books of account have been kept by the
company, and whether proper returns adequate for the audit
have been received from branches not actually visited by the
auditors;
(3) whether the company's balance sheet and profit and loss
account agree with the company's books and returns;
(4) whether, in the auditors' opinions and to the best of their
knowledge according to the information and explanations given
to them, the accounts give a true and fair view of the company's
financial position. 3
There is, however, no specific statement in the accountant's certification, as there is in the United States, that the balance sheet and related
statements of income and retained earnings have been examined and
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Thus, there appears to be a greater range in the quality of reporting in
the British accounting profession than there is in the United States.

For public companies that are quoted on the London Exchange, the
applied standards and the quality of accountants are comparable to
those found in the United States. The Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, the largest of the accounting
bodies recognized by the Board of Trade, has rigorous standards for
admission. An individual must be an articled clerk, i.e., an apprentice,
for a period of from three to five years and must then pass an
extensive series of examinations. 36 The Institute has approximately
134. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 13. There are officially designated
standards for ethics in clauses 20 and 21 of the Supplemental Royal Charter.
INSTITTUE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

IN ENGLAND AND WALES,

MEMBERS HANDBOOK, Practical Points, § P, at 11. See PROFFESSIONAL
ACCOUNTING, supra note 131, ch. 19, at 11.
135. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 17, 18; THE INSTITUTE OF
CHARTERED

ACCOUNTANTS

IN

ENGLAND

AND

WALES,

PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING, Statement on Auditing No.
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING, supra note 131, ch. 19, at

GENERAL

1, at 8 (1961); and
14.
136. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 5-10. In the United States, a
college degree plus a minimum number of credits in accounting courses is
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42,500 members and a professional staff of over 100.1"7 The
Institute has a regular procedure for handling complaints when they
are submitted by members of the public, as well as a standing
investigating committee that takes disciplinary action against members. The Institute also has a professional standards committee that is
designed to encourage members to follow recommendations of the
Institute in connection with achieving uniform auditing procedures.
For example, the Institute recently issued a statement on auditing
which recommended detailed procedures for internal control and
verification of physical assets.1 38 The Institute thus far has concentrated its efforts on improving existing accounting and auditing
procedures, rather than attempting to establish uniform accounting
principles. In this respect, the Institute's activity is similar to that of
the A.I.C.P.A., although the latter organization also has been taking
some reluctant steps toward uniformity of accounting principles and
financial reporting.
When a company is seeking a quotation on the London Stock
Exchange, the issuing house involved frequently will require an
independent investigation by auditors other than the company's
regular auditors. When this is done, the prospectus will contain the
names of both accountants, one of whom is designated as "the
reporting accountant."' " As an unwritten rule, the Exchange insists
that either the company's accountant or the reporting accountant be
one of a relatively small number of major accounting firms. The
Exchange places great reliance on the reputation of these firms. A firm
brought in as a reporting accountant frequently will insist on
conducting an extensive independent audit check of the company,
including checks on internal control, verification of inventories,
inspection of the actual physical plant and circularization of accounts
receivable. 40
As discussed earlier, the degree of disclosure in the financial
statements of British companies is much less extensive than is required
required. In most states, a practice requirement from one to three years is
required before completing all parts of the C.P.A. exam.
137. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 10; THE INSTITUTE OF
CHARTERED

ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORTS AND

AccoUNTs 21 (1966). "The number of members of the Institute on January 1,
1967 was 43,457." Id.
138. THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND
AND WALES, INTERNAL CONTROL, Statement on Auditing No. 4 (1964).
139. ACCOUNTANCY, supra note 130, at 21.
140. See London Times, March 6 & 7, 1970, for a description of the use of
separate accountants.
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in the United States. A significant omission is that of subsequent
balance sheet events and of events that have occurred after the
company's year end.' 4 1 Moreover, the information that is disclosed is
not scrutinized to the same extent as in the United States. The Board
of Trade does not check any filed financial statements, either 1the
42
annual accounts or those submitted in connection with new issues.
The London Exchange, while taking a somewhat more active role in
the last few years in the overall scrutiny of prospectuses, still has done
relatively little with financial statements. In this regard, the only
noteworthy effort to date is a recent memorandum prepared by the

Exchange in consultation with the Institute of Chartered Public
Accountants that specifies the form of presentation of certain
items of the financial statement. This memorandum has now been
incorporated into the London Exchange requirements.
Although less information is actually disclosed in the financial
statements by the accountant, and in spite of the fact that there is less
scrutiny of the financial statements by the regulatory authorities, the
role of the British accountant in securities regulation is more
substantial than that of his American counterpart. Accountants in the
United Kingdom are expected to make judgments of value and fact to
a much greater extent than are accountants in the United States. This
situation derives in part from the historical role of the accountant in
the United Kingdom. Within a British corporation, the auditor has
long been considered an officer of the company and a vital part of its
management.' 4 3 He also is expected to be independent of management and to play the neutral role of an umpire watching over
shareholder interests. British accountants do almost all the tax work,
and are heavily involved in liquidations and as trustees. They
frequently act as financial advisers to individuals and are entitled to
obtain a share in commissions from members of the London Exchange
on securities sales and from insurance companies on sales of insurance
policies. British accountants also are continually asked to render
opinions to investment bankers and other members of the financial
141. PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANCING, supra note 131, ch. 19, at 15.
142. A demand by 200 shareholders or a shareholder holding not less than
one-tenth of the shares issued is necessary before the Board of Trade will appoint
an inspector to investigate the company's affairs. The application must be
supported by such evidence as the Board may require in order to show good
reason for investigation. If from the inspector's report it appears to the Board that
any person has been guilty of a criminal offense, the matter is referred to the
Director of Public Prosecution. See K. SMITH & D. KEENAN, COMPANY LAW
143-45 (1966).
143. See The Queen v. Shacter, [1960] 1 All E.R. 61 (Crim. App.).
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community regarding such matters as the soundness of various
companies.
This reliance upon the opinion of the accountant is evident in the
requirements of the London Stock Exchange. Accountants must
submit letters to the Quotations Department concerning three
separate matters. 4 4 The first is merely a statement that generally
accepted accounting principles have been used in connection with any
audit of stock or other work in progress. This is a matter that would
normally be handled by opinion letter in the United States. 1 4 5 The
other two items ask for opinions concerning the reasonableness of
amounts taken for depreciation and amortization, and the reporting of
the equalization of taxation provisions. 4 6 These opinions call for
highly subjective judgments by the British accountants. In addition,
the directors of a company are required to give their opinions
regarding the sufficiency of working capital and the prospects for
earnings for the coming year. 1 41 While the accountant does not sign
these opinions of the directors, it is generally assumed that the
accountants approve them4 and that they are justified by the financial
account of the company.'

1

Reliance is also placed on the value judgments of the British
accountants in the independent audit required of member firms of the
London Stock Exchange.' 4 9 In referring to the sections imposing this
requirement, the Institute of Chartered Public Accountants has made
the following statement: "Important responsibility rests upon the
independent accountant. The report required of him is partly a
statement of fact and partly a statement of opinion."' 50 The
financial community appears to rely more upon the certification and

144. MEMBERS HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 6; STOCK EXCHANGE
RULES app. 34, schedule II, pt. A, item 21.
145. MEMBERS HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 6, 7.
146. MEMBERS HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 7, 12.62.
12.65; PROFES147. MEMBERS HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 21,
SIONAL ACCOUNTING, supra note 131, at 28.
148. PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING, supra note 131, at 28. In the U.S. the
accountant certifies only the financial statements indicated in his opinion letter;
all the other parts of the report are written by the company, and the accountant
has no responsibility for its contents.
149. MEMBERS HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 9.
150. MEMBERS HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 8. He has to state as a fact

whether the balance sheet shows assets (as specially defined) in excess of liabilities
(as specially defined) to an extent not less than the minimum margins of solvency.
An opinion must also be given that the balance sheet gives a true and fair picture
of the affairs of the firm, and that it complies with various requirements.
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opinion of the accountant than upon the information disclosed in his
account. This attitude corresponds with other aspects of securities
regulation in Great Britain; the principle emphasis is placed on the
men behind the companies and "the integrity of management," rather
than on full disclosure of company results. There is less concern than
in the United States over whether the accountant has disclosed
essential information sufficient to permit the investor to determine for
himself the status of a company. Instead, reliance is directed to the
fact that an outside expert, the accountant, has investigated the
company and, in his opinion, the accounts contain nothing fraudulent
or misleading.1 5 1

III.
A.

REGULATION OF TRADING

The Mechanics of the Secondary Market

1. The Secondary Market in Securities.-A recent survey by the
London Stock Exchange estimates that 2,500,000 British citizensapproximately seven per cent of the population-directly own
securities quoted on the London Exchange. In addition, it is estimated
through
that 22,500,000 persons in Great Britain are indirect investors
1
life insurance, pension schemes and unit trusts. 52 Almost all
secondary trading of these securities is done through the London

Exchange. This is true not only of ordinary shares of corporations, but
also of fixed-interest corporate securities and government securities.
There is no over-the-counter market as it is known in the United
States, and there is virtually no trading in unlisted securities. Some
trading of listed securities does take place through non-members of
the London Exchange-generally by merchant banks matching orders
of institutional investors-but it is relatively minor.
Brokers on the London Exchange are required to submit trading
data in only six broad categories:
(1) British Government and government guarantees under 5
years;
(2) British Government and government guarantees over 5
years;
(3) local authority bonds;
(4) overseas government, provincial and municipal bonds;
151. See In re Thomas Gerrard & Son, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 84; 111 S.J. 329;
[1967] 2 All E.R. 525.
152. REVELL & MOYLE, OWNERS OF QUOTED ORDINARY SHARES
(1967).
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(5) fixed-interest preference and preferred shares; and
(6)

ordinary shares.'

3

Comparison of the total value of the securities in these categories to
the turnover rate of the securities reveals that there is an active and
extremely liquid market in British Government and government
guaranteed securities, but that there is a relatively low turnover and
trading volume in British local authorities, overseas government and all
fixed-interest and preferred securities.1 I In terms of monetary value,
trading in ordinary shares represents only about 20 per cent of the
trading volume that takes place on the London Exchange.' 5 5 On the
other hand, in terms of the number of transactions, about 80 per cent
of the trading is done in ordinary shares. Although statistics on
individual securities are not available, it is estimated that there are
relatively free trading markets in roughly 1,000 of the approximately
8,000 securities of the 3,842 listed companies. By United States
standards, active securities trading exists in only about 200 securities.
Under the current London Exchange rules, it is not permissible for
a member to trade individually; rather, he must be a member of, or be
associated with, a firm of at least two members. 1 56 In contrast to the
situation on the New York Stock Exchange, where a large brokerage
firm may have only one or two partners that actually have seats on the
New York Exchange, it is necessary in Great Britain to be a member
of the London Exchange in order to be a partner of a stock exchange
firm. The firm may, however, employ trading clerks who have
authority to go onto the floor and actually transact business in the
name of the member firm; in fact, much of the actual trading is done
by these clerks. 151 On the New York Stock Exchange, on the other
hand, all of the actual floor trading is done by members only.
As of March 24, 1967, the London Exchange had 3,208 members,
divided into some 225 broker firms and 45 jobber firms.' 58
Amalgamations and combinations have continued to diminish these
numbers. In large part, the movement toward merger of member firms
can be traced to the 1966-67 decline in the business and profits of
stock exchange firms.' 1 9 The contraction of trading volume during
153. The Exchange furnishes this information to the Bank of England daily,
but only publishes the figures on a monthly basis.
154. Bank of England StatisticalQuarterlyReport.

155. Id.
156. STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 86 (1).
157. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES 59, 67 (1).
158. MEMBERS BOOK OF LONDON EXCHANGE.
159. It is indicative that during this period 217 members resigned compared
to 137 new members. In addition 30 members died, which left a net loss of about
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that period was attributed to changes in the tax laws. Britain, for the
first time, instituted a long-term capital gains tax and, at the same
time, altered the corporate tax. These changes resulted in less
attractive dividend yields; the economy suffered a general slow-down;
and, finally, securities prices slowly slipped. This recent tendency for
stock exchange firms to merge into larger trading units has been
particularly true of jobber firms. It is argued that the larger trading
units are necessary in order to allow the jobbers to take a large
position in the various securities markets and to trade in larger blocks
of stock. Furthermore, it is contended that greater efficiency results
from larger units and that this helps overcome increasing costs.
2. The Jobbing System.-The jobbing system in Great Britain
involves a complete separation of the functions of broker and dealer.
The jobber does not deal directly with the investing public; rather, his
contact is only with brokers.1 6 0 In every transaction the jobber is, at
least in form, a principal who is buying or selling for his own account.
A broker must execute every transaction through a jobber and is not
permitted to cross orders within his own firm or to deal directly with
other brokers. In contrast, on the New York Stock Exchange, brokers
are constantly dealing directly with other brokers. The function of the
jobber on the London market has been described as follows:
His job is primarily to create a market by setting his price to reflect the
balance of buying and selling in stock, and at the same time, in his capacity
as a principal, to act as a buffer against short term variations in price. He
cannot by himself influence the ebb and flow of supply and demand for
more than a very short period of time and he would never willingly become,
even for a short period, the equivalent of an investment trust, if by so doing
his ability to make a market becomes affected. He should
act on the
61
principle that a "fast nickel is better than a slow dime."'
The role of the specialist on the New York Stock Exchange
corresponds in many ways to that of the jobber. However, unlike the
jobber, the specialist usually enters a transaction only when there is a
lack of buyers or sellers at a reasonable price. On the London Stock
Exchange, the jobber is involved in either the buying or selling end of
100 members. The price of membership fell to a low of £20 in 1966, as compared
to a price of over £2000 three years earlier.
160. In respect to all of their business, jobbers do not simply sit back and
wait for brokers to call them. The major jobbers are active in selling securities and
contacting brokers. Although jobbers are not supposed to have direct dealings
with clients, they do in fact have extensive contact with major institutions and
constantly furnish them with information.
161. Lewis, Jobbing Today, THE STOCK EXCHANGE JOURNAL, March,
1964, at 21.
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every transaction. Trading on the London Exchange can be compared
to trading in the United States on an "organized" over-the-counter
market.
Both jobbers in Great Britain and specialists on United States
exchanges tend to be extremely defensive about their roles. As a
result, public statements by members of both professions stress the
public service functions of their roles and imply that they involve
great personal sacrifice. Nonetheless, the irrefutable fact remains that
the jobber, like the specialist, is in business to make a profit. A fuller
understanding of their respective roles can be achieved by bearing in
mind this fact. The jobber is interested primarily in the volume and
velocity of the turnover. In an active securities market with numerous
buyers and sellers, the jobber primarily matches orders. He buys and
sells for his own account as a principal, but, as a practical matter, his
risk is small because his profit from each transaction is in the nature of
a commission. The "jobber's turn" compensates him for playing this
matching role. A jobber may accumulate a substantial long or short
position in active securities, but since there is a large turnover of these
securities, the positions fluctuate. Jobbers make most of their profits
1
from this activity on the 100 most actively traded securities. 62
Perhaps one reason for the defensive attitude of the jobber is that it is

in the most actively traded securities that his function is least needed
because there tends to be great liquidity in these securities and jobbers
are able to handle large block transactions. In these active securities,
the major jobbers are often willing to give a firm price on as much as a
one million pound order.
Approximately 400 to 500 other securities have occasional active
trading markets, depending on the general level of the market and on
specific news items relating to individual companies. In these
securities, the jobber's profits still come from the jobber's turn, but
since there is less turnover and a narrower market, there is a greater
risk to the jobber in building large positions. In the remainder of the
quoted securities, the markets are relatively inactive. Jobbers are
reluctant to maintain large positions in these inactive securities
because capital is tied up and there is a great danger of capital loss
from rapid price fluctuation. Jobbers are particularly reticent about
becoming short in such securities. It is in the large group of relatively
inactively traded securities that the jobber function is most needed. At
the same time, it is in these securities where there is the greatest risk
162. The most actively traded securities naturally vary. It is indicative that
until recently there were 18 jobbers handling the stock of Imperial Chemical
Industries (I.C.I.). Through amalgamation and combinations of jobber firms the
number is now reported to be about 12.
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to the jobber and the smallest amount of profit. In these less actively
traded securities, a jobber will often refuse to handle a large
transaction unless he knows there is a purchaser or seller on the other
side.
On the London Exchange, the notion of a stock exchange
monopoly is based not on the fact that all transactions take place on
the floor of the Exchange, but rather on the fact that Exchange
members must be involved. Members of the London Exchange may
deal in quoted securities at any time or place so long as the transaction
is with a jobber.' 63 This procedure is in contrast to that of the New
York Stock Exchange, where members are required to transact all
business on the floor of the New York Exchange and where all
transactions must appear on the Exchange's ticker tape.
A controversy currently exists between merchant banks and jobbers
regarding the extent to which the large orders of institutions should go
through a London Exchange broker or jobber. The merchant banks
argue that in the case of many securities, the jobbers cannot handle
the transaction and thus the bank itself must find the other party. In
many issues, particularly fixed-interest securities (bond issues) that
were initially placed privately, there is no liquidity for the shares on
the Exchange. If an institutional investor wishes to sell a large block, it
must be arranged through another institutional investor or group of
investors. Brokers will often play an active role in arranging block
transfers, binding the purchaser or buyer to the other side and then
putting the whole transaction through a jobber. In this type of
transaction, the jobber usually will be given a very small turn. There
are no restrictions on either merchant or commercial banks in
arranging block transactions. Many of the large merchant banks act as
investment advisers for large institutional investors and frequently
arrange transactions with their own clients and with the clients of
other banks. In these instances, neither the Exchange broker nor the
jobber obtains any commission. Members of the Exchange argue that
unless jobbers are given business by which they can profit, they will
not be able to perform their function when dealing with less active
securities.
The Exchange has recognized the problem of maintaining jobber
profits by insisting that "put through" business be given to jobbers
and by insisting that even in the private placement of debt securities,
jobbers be entitled to at least 30 per cent of the offering. This latter
restriction gives jobbers what in effect amounts to an underwriting
163. One of the largest jobber firms has a trading post at its office, and is
reported to transact as much business by telephone after hours as it does on the
Exchange floor.
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commission. Perhaps other steps such as allowing jobbers to deal
directly with institutions in certain block transactions would be more
effective in maintaining jobber profits. Nonetheless, the jobbing
system is an efficient one for transacting business and results in
increased liquidity and general price stability. However, neither the
jobbing system nor the specialist system can create markets where
none previously exists.
The maintenance of free and open markets may be evaluated by a
variety of criteria, including the avoidance of conflicts of interest, the
presence of competitive markets and a full disclosure of trading data.
The jobbing system performs relatively well in the first two areas. The
separation of functions of broker and dealer in Great Britain also
reduces conflicts of interest in the trading process. If a jobber were
permitted to have a retail operation, it would be difficult to protect
both his self-interest and the interest of the investor. For example, a

large position obtained by the trading branch of a jobbing firm might
lead to increased sales activity in the retail branch in order to reduce
the position. This is a situation that occurs in the United States in
over-the-counter securities. Furthermore, the specialist and other
members on the New York Stock Exchange may act either as agents
for customers or as dealers in their own accounts. If this situation is
not regulated, the member's self-interest may compete with that of his
client. The recent trading rules of the New York Stock Exchange have
limited the extent to which ordinary members may trade for their
own accounts on the floor of the Exchange, 1 6 4 and extensive rules
regulate trading by the specialist in competition with trading by
members of the public.1 6 S Likewise, brokers in the United Kingdom
must place all their own orders through a jobber or must sell to the
public at a price that is equal to or lower than the price that a jobber
would charge for the same securities. 16 6 On the London Exchange,
the jobber does not have public customers and all trades, therefore,
are exclusively for his own account. As a matter of practice, individual
members of jobber firms keep all their personal transactions outside of
the firm. All of their own transactions are put through brokers like
those of any other investor.
Potential conflict of interest problems arise in two other situations.
The first is when London Exchange members become directors of
public companies. Jobbers do not become directors of public
companies precisely because it is felt that this would create too great a
164. N.Y.S.E. RULE 91 (taking or supplying securities named in an order),
RULE 92 (limitations on members trading because of customers orders).
165. N.Y.S.E. RULE 104 (dealings by specialists).
166.

STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 87.
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potential for conflicts of interest. The same restrictions, however, do
not apply to brokers. Many people in the financial community think
this is unwise and are critical of the practice. When a broker is a
director of a company, there is always the tendency to read something
into any transaction that he conducts in his own company's securities.
The second potential conflict of interest situation arises when jobbers
are involved in take-over bids. Probably the most serious problem
exists when the jobbers have access to information that is not available
to the general public. There are no ground rules in these situations on
what the jobber is obligated to disclose or what actions he is to
take.1 6 The danger of a false market and manipulation is increased
when there is only a single source of supply of a security. Even for
inactively traded securities, the presence of at least two jobbers for
every security provides some competition, although a second jobber
may offer little actual investor protection.
Judged by the third criteria by which the maintenance of free and
open markets may be evaluated-the full disclosure of trading
data--the jobbing system in Great Britain is weak. There is no ticker
comparable to that maintained by the New York Stock Exchange.
Volume and price information is not available. Furtheremore, while
the jobbers "mark" some trades, they are not required to disclose any
information to the London Exchange or any other authority. The
marking system does insure that the price of actual trades is publicly
known, but it does not provide for disclosure of either the number of
shares transferred or the volume of shares traded at that price. The
marks are reported in the financial press as a way to protect the jobber
and broker from criticism by customers. In this respect, it is an
improvement on the over-the-counter market in the United States,
where the bid and ask price is disclosed, but not the actual price at
which the transaction takes place. The markings for the inactively
traded securities tend to be fairly accurate. In respect to the more
actively traded securities, however, many bargains are not marked,
and, in general, the markings are less representative.
As mentioned earlier, brokers disclose daily their total trading to
the London Exchange in six broad categories. But there is no
disclosure by brokers of their volume in individual trades. Although
the jobber keeps an account of all his transactions with brokers in the
different securities in which he is trading, most jobbers would object
to regulations requiring disclosure of actual trading volume and prices
in individual securities on a daily basis.' 6 8 Their objection would be
167. The City Code on take-overs and mergers offers broad general guidelines,
but does not specifically treat jobbers duties.
168. Some of the largest jobbers are extremely efficient and control
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that if the jobber had to disclose all of his transactions, the position of
the jobber in individual securities would become known and he could
be vulnerable to buying or selling pressure. For example, if a jobber
disclosed that he had been purchasing a large number of shares and
thus probably had a long position, this could make it difficult for him
to sell the shares without substantially lowering the price. Consequently, jobbers fear that they would not be able to take long positions if
these had to be disclosed, particularly with respect to inactively traded
securities.
Because of the lack of any central source of trading data, the
London Exchange is not in a position to operate a stock watch
program, nor is it in a position to make effective investigation of
unusual price movements. Although individual jobbing firms are able
to disclose from their records all of the transactions in the particular

securities, this information usually is not disclosed to the Exchange.
The London Exchange may, however, obtain the trading data by a
Council investigation if a special request is submitted. Many brokers
and some jobbers acknowledge the problem of lack of reporting and
feel that efforts should be made to achieve some disclosure of trading
data in at least the more active securities. But in spite of the paucity
of trading data and the lack of regulation, the trading system on the
London Exchange is held in "high" regard by the investing public. The
separation of functions, the presence of at least two jobbers in most
securities traded, and the generally high reputation of the members of
the London Exchange all contribute to the positive belief of the
investing public that the London market is fair and that the prices are
honest.
3. The Brokerage Function.-The most startling comparison between the secondary trading markets in Great Britain and the United
States involves the differing roles played by the stock broker in the
two countries. The brokerage firms in London do not advertise and
have practically no sales personnel who are not members of the
London Exchange. For instance, a relatively large firm with a
maximum of twenty partners 6 9 may have less than ten other
individuals in the firm who would ever deal directly with customers.
Branch offices are permitted under strict conditions, but there are few
in existence. The main offices of the firms are located near the
London Stock Exchange and are not equipped for direct customer
operations with computers. They are able to provide the various brokers with a
print out of all transactions on a daily basis. This allows the individual brokers to
check their own records against those of the jobbers.
169. Until 1968 a partnership was limited to twenty partners. Some stock
exchange firms have expanded slightly in the past two years.
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contact. There is no ticker tape and few waiting rooms; one usually
visits one's broker only by appointment. A recent survey of individual
investors made by the London Exchange indicated that only about 30
per cent of the individual investors deal in securities through brokers
and only about 10 per cent have a particular broker of whom they ask
advice. Furthermore, over 50 per cent of the individual investors
indicated that they deal in securities through their banks.1 7 0 The role
of the banks, however, is strictly that of an intermediary because they
do not actively sell or give investment advice; they simply transmit
orders to brokers. Under the rules of the London Exchange, banks,
solicitors and chartered accountants can all share in commissions up to
a specified percentage of the commission. 1 7 1 Members of brokerage
firms and employees generally are compensated either on the basis of
a salary or a bonus reflecting the direction of the firm's total profits.
The only compensation on a commission basis to members and
employees of brokerage firms is the practice of returning commissions
to those who introduce business personally. This is in sharp contrast
to the practice in the United States, where most brokers advertise
extensively, have numerous branch offices and employ many salesmen. Furthermore, almost all American securities salesmen are
compensated on the basis of commissions related to their individual
business.

In addition to the differences in trading operations in the two
countries, there are also differences in attitude. The stock broker in
the United States recognizes that he is involved in marketing, and
most are willing to be characterized as salesmen. The typical stock
broker in England would be horrified by this description. Some
brokers in Great Britain, however, particularly in the larger and more
efficient firms, are beginning to take active steps in the marketing of
securities. This activity has been directed particularly toward institutional investors, and, in this respect, some London brokers maintain
extensive investment research departments and supply material to
their major institutional clients. Part of the basic difference in attitude
toward selling stems from the underlying approaches to security
investment. In the United Kingdom, the investor traditionally has
been concerned primarily with yield rather than with capital appreciation. A British investor would buy securities for a certain percentage
return on his investment and sell only when this yield was not
maintained. The concept of purchasing securities for capital appreciation is only slowly becoming accepted by investors and brokers. This

170. Survey of Share Ownership,
September, 1965.
171.

STOCK EXCHANGE RULE
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change in attitude in Great Britain is being stimulated by investment
institutions that are performance conscious.
Automation is coming slowly both to the London Exchange itself
and to its members. A few of the large jobbers and some brokers
recently have installed computers and other devices to handle
bookkeeping and to obtain current quotations. In many of the
brokerage offices, however, the process of obtaining a price quotation
is still quite leisurely. The situation at the London Exchange itself
does not help matters: there is no ticker tape, and all prices have to be
obtained by sending clerks out onto the trading floor and having them
report back to price boards maintained by the brokerage firms.
However, a price dissemination service for active stocks that will use
television receivers wired to a centralized service is being initiated by
the Exchange Council. In addition, the new London Exchange
building and new automation will hopefully change current prac-

tice.
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There are no statistics available to indicate the extent to which
securities are purchased on margin in Great Britain,' " but it is
assumed that relatively little margin buying is done. There are no
restrictions imposed by the London Exchange on margin sales by
Exchange members, and they are exempt from any restrictions by the
Board of Trade .1 7 4 The only limitation on a broker is a practical one
based on his own ability to borrow funds and his confidence in his
client.

B. Statutory Restrictions and Regulation by the Board of 7Tade
1. GenerL Description.-The statutory restrictions on the selling
and trading of securities are contained in the Prevention of Fraud Act
of 1958.17 The Act makes a three-pronged attack on the problems
surrounding investor fraud: it prohibits securities dealing except by
172. See the description of new building communication plans in the
Exchange publication, REBUILDING OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE (1965).
173. STOCK ExCHANGE RULES 96-99 cover bargains and settlement of
accounts.
174. Licensed dealers are forbidden from selling on credit.
175. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45. The
1958 Act was essentially a re-enactment of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
Act of 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 16. The Protection of Depositors Act of 1963, c. 16,
has since added a few amendments to the 1958 Act. The Companies Act of 1948
which regulates the internal activities of companies and the initial issuance of
securities is not concerned with trading subsequent to the original issue. The
Prevention of Fraud Act resulted from the work of two special committees
appointed to investigate abuses in selling practices. The reports of these
Winter, 1971

SECURITIES REGULA TIONIN GREAT BRITAIN

licensed dealers or other persons specifically exempted from licensing;
it prohibits the distribution of any circular relating to the purchase or
sale of any security unless distributed by a licensed or exempted
dealer; and it makes false or deceptive statements in connection with
the sale or purchase of a security or other investment contract a
criminal offense.
While the form of the Act gives the Board of Trade authority to
regulate those who trade in securities, the Board plays a relatively

small role in the actual operation of the Act. Primarily, the Board
determines who is entitled to an exempted status. Once a brokerdealer is within this category, the Board of Trade exercises no further
regulation or control over him. Although accurate statistics on trading
volume are not available, it is estimated that over 90 per cent of all
securities trading is handled by persons who are in an exempted status
under the Prevention of Fraud Act. For the small group of dealers in
securities that in fact is licensed, the Board of Trade has issued some
regulations concerning trading activity. Even in this instance, however,
the Board of Trade does not take an active role in regulation.
Enforcement action under the licensing authority or under the general
fraud provision is rare.
2. Regulation of Dealers in an Exempted Status Under the
Prevention of Fraud Act.-Those British dealers exempted from the
licensing provisions and the prohibitions against the issuance of
circulars in the Prevention of Fraud Act fall into three categories:
members of recognized stock exchanges or recognized associations of
dealers; dealers acting as managers or trustees for unit trusts; and
dealers who are exempted specifically by the Board of Trade. In the
first two categories, the Board does not approve individuals as such,
but only verifies that they are either members of an approved
organization or officers of a properly licensed unit trust.
The Board of Trade has authority to declare that any group of
persons is a recognized exchange or association of dealers. The Board
has complete discretion and is specifically given authority to vary or
revoke an order granting recognition. The Board of Trade currently
recognizes four exchanges and five associations. 1 6 In no instance has
recognition been made conditional, and there have been no
restrictions attached to any exchange or association or to any broker
committees revealed flagrant instances of fraud both in the selling of securities

and in the handling of investor funds. BOARD OF TRADE DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEE ON FIXED TRUSTS, REPORT, CMD. No.

5259 (1936) [hereinaf-

ter cited as the ANDERSON REPORT]; BOARD OF TRADE DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEE ON SHARE-PUSHING, REPORT, CMD. No. 5539 (1939).
176. ANNUAL REPORT BOARD OF TRADE (1967).
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or dealer member. The Board has not issued any regulations governing
the exchanges, nor has it required reports of any type to be submitted.
The Board of Trade does not check unusual price movements of
traded securities or the trading practices and behavior on the
recognized exchanges. The internal rules of the exchanges are not
checked and there is not even a flow of information to the Board of
Trade on the nature of the rules or the extent of the discipline
exercised by the exchanges over their membership.
During the Jenkins Committee investigation, some members ap-

peared surprised at this complete lack of regulation by the Board of
Trade over recognized exchanges and associations. At the end of the
Board's testimony before the Committee, Professor Gower made the
following statement:
In reply to earlier questions it is said the great advantage of channeling
things through the stock exchange and licensed dealers was that you were
able to exercise supervision over them. However, because of your reply to
the last five or six questions we are not sure what the supervision is.' 7
There is apparently some feeling by the Board of Trade that it lacks
authority to regulate the exchanges. In public statements, the Board
has clearly expressed a reluctance to take an active regulatory role
whether or not they have the authority.' 78 In stating, however, that
the Board of Trade is unaware of what takes place on the various
stock exchanges-both in respect to aspects of trading and to the
various internal rules and regulations controlling the members of the
exchanges-criticism is not indended. It is simply that the Board of
Trade does not feel responsible for such matters.
A comparison between this complete lack of regulation of trading
in Great Britain and the regulatory activities of the S.E.C. in the
United States is dramatic. Starting from a similar statutory basis, the
S.E.C. exercises a supervisory, as well as a licensing, role. Direct
regulation of trading and stock exchanges by the S.E.C. has been
extensive, particularly in the past few years following the Special
Study of the Securities Markets. 7 9 Throughout its history, the S.E.C.
has demanded comprehensive reports from both the exchanges and
their members and has moved actively in response to specific
complaints and problems.
Aside from exempting members of the stock exchanges, the Board
of Trade also has authority to grant exemptions from the licensing

177. JENKINS
178. JENKINS
179.

REPORT,
REPORT,

supra note 5, at 1535.
supra note 5, at 1532.

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1963).
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provisions and the restrictions on distributing circulars to a broad
group of dealers. The principal bases for granting an exemption appear
to be financial soundness and general reputation within the financial
community. The main business of an exempted dealer must be other
than that of dealing in securities." 8 0 As a practical matter, this group
of exempted dealers includes most merchant and commercial banks
and the large institutional investors that sometimes act as underwriters."' 8 Individuals who occasionally deal in securities, such as
solicitors or accountants, do not need an exemption. The Board of
Trade recognizes that dealers in the exempted status are completely
free from all restrictions. For instance, they do not need to be
members of any exchange or association; there are no minimum
capital requirements; there is no need for them to make reports to any
third party; and they are free from the regulations that apply to
licensed dealers--including the requirements to maintain certain books
and records, and restrictions on credit sales of securities.

As a matter of practice, all applications for exemptions are
forwarded to the Bank of England for a report. The Bank of England
advises the Board of Trade both on aspects of general reputation and
financial soundness. Although the Board is not obligated to follow the
opinion of the Bank, this is almost always done. If an application is
made by a party unknown to the Bank, it will conduct an
investigation. The Bank does not exercise any direct regulation over
dealers, but it does request that certain statistical reports be filed with
it. Most "exempted dealers" are banks, and thus recognize the general
8 2
supervisory role played by the Bank of England.'
The regulatory scheme established by the Prevention of Fraud Act
is designed to place most of those dealing in securities under some
trade association or stock exchange; it assumes that the organization
will exercise direct regulation. In practice, however, there is little
regulation from any source other than the London Stock Exchange. It
could be argued, therefore, that there would be more effective
regulation if it were required that all dealers other than members of
the London Stock Exchange be licensed because there exists at least
some restrictions and reporting requirements for the licensed dealers.
3. Licensed Dealers.-As mentioned earlier, the number of dealers
actually licensed is relatively small and includes only those parties who
180. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §
16.
181. Exempted dealers are listed annually in Board of Trade publication
PARTICULARS OF DEALERS IN SECURITIES AND OF UNIT TRUSTS.

182. The Bank of England has taken a more active role in respect to the code
on take-overs and mergers.
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are not members of a recognized stock exchange or association, and
are not an exempted bank or insurance company. There are only
about 75 licensed dealers listed in the 1967 report of the Board of
Trade. 8 3 In addition, it is acknowledged by the Board that many of
these may be out of business. Since there are no provisions for a
periodic check on licensed dealers, the Board of Trade would not be
informed when they stopped trading in securities. When it comes to
the attention of the Board that a licensed dealer has stopped doing
business, the dealer is merely removed from the list.
The Board of Trade may deny a license if the applicant has been
convicted of an offense involving fraud or dishonesty or for acts in
violation of the Prevention of Fraud Act.1 8 4 In addition, the Board is
given wide discretion to deny a license "by reason of any other
circumstances whatsoever which either are likely to lead to the
improper conduct of business by, or reflect discredit upon the method
of conducting business of, the applicant or holder or any person so
employed by or associated with him .... I8s In practice, however,
this discretionary power of the Board of Trade is rarely used.
The Board of Trade has issued one set of regulations for licensed
dealers. These regulations include requirements on the form of
contract notes, requirements for the maintenance of certain books,
accounts and documents, and a prohibition against licensed dealers
being involved in any margin, contango, or put-and-call business. The
regulations also contain specific provisions relating to take-over bids.
In order to continue in business, every dealer is required to maintain a
minimum capital of five hundred pounds. The Board of Trade does
not require that any reports be made by licensed dealers, nor are there
any continuing checks made on their activities. There is little
information available on the kind of business carried out by licensed
dealers due primarily to the Board of Trade's belief that licensed
dealers are generally small operators or foreign brokers and that they
account for a very small percentage of the security business.
C. Regulation by the London Stock Exchange
While membership in a self-regulatory group is recognized under the
Prevention of Fraud Act as forming a basis for an exemption from
licensing, the London Stock Exchange is the only body that performs
any substantial regulatory role.

183.

ANNUAL REPORT BOARD OF TRADE (1967).

184. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 &7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, § 5.
185. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Elz. 2, c. 45, §
5 (2) (b).
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1. Requirements for Exchange Membership.-Admission to membership on the London Stock Exchange is based on approval by the
other members of the Exchange. The candidate must be male, at least
21 years of age and a British citizen.' 8 6 The candidate must have
been a clerk in training with a member firm for a period of three years
or have had some other professional experience. Furthermore, as of
1970, candidates are required to pass an examination on the operation
of the London Exchange and the securities markets.' 7 The procedure involved is similar to that for obtaining membership in a
private social club: the candidate must have a proposer and seconder,
both of whom must be members, and his name must be posted for a
period of eight days prior to being voted on by the membership
committee. The principal restrictions referred to in membership
requirements relate to whether the member will have the financial
backing and stability necessary to meet all of his bargains.!' 8 Finally,
the candidate must have a "seat" or "nomination," and unless this is
obtained from another source-e.g., inheritance-it must be purchased.
The purchase of a nomination is a requirement prior to the time of
election. The price of a nomination has ranged from as much as
2,000 pounds to as little as 20 pounds in the last few years. Although
these entrance requirements appear meager, they are more difficult than
they were a few years ago. In 1962, a two-year apprentice requirement
was first instituted; in 1965, the duration was increased to three years.
It was not until 1970 that the examination requirement took effect.
A member firm may hire clerks who are "authorized" to transact
business under the authority of the firm. An authorized clerk, known
as a dealer, must have at least two years experience before he can
attain that status.' 89 There are no examinations or educational

requirements for the hiring of clerks and their activities are the
responsibility of the member firm. As mentioned earlier, a clerk can
transact business on the London Exchange, but, as a condition to this
privilege, all partners of the employer firm must be members of the
Exchange. The distinction between authorized and unauthorized
clerks concerns only the matter of who may trade on the floor of the
London Exchange. An authorized clerk may appear on the floor and
trade either as a broker or as a jobber. An unauthorized clerk,
however, may appear on the Exchange floor, but cannot handle any
transactions himself. 90
186. STOCK
187. STOCK
188. STOCK
189. STOCK
190. STOCK
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There is no direct supervision by the London Exchange over
members' office employees. Nor are there restrictions on the number
of sales personnel that a firm may have, although in fact most firms
hire relatively few salesmen who are not members of the Exchange.
The chief reason for office personnel, including salesmen, to become
members of the London Stock Exchange is not merely because it is a
requirement for ultimate partnership, but also because membership
without partnership entitles the holder to a larger commission on
clients' business than non-members can claim. The London Exchange
does list individuals connected with the firm that may sell or deal with
the public because such persons usually transact business on the floor
of the Exchange as well. However, the Exchange also includes those
known as half-commission, or associate, members (i.e., non-partners)
of firms.
2. Regulation of Trading.-There are few specific regulations
concerning the trading activities of brokers and jobbers in the United
Kingdom when compared to those in the United States. However, the
rule book issued by the London Stock Exchange is fairly extensive
and, in the minds of London stockbrokers, the burden of rules and
restrictions is rapidly increasing. A member is not allowed to advertise
or issue circulars to parties other than his own clients.' 91 Aside from
this, there are no restrictions on the selling practices of British brokers
and dealers. There are no restrictions on margin account or margin
selling by brokers, nor is there any recording requirement to reflect
the extent of margin trading.
The degree to which British brokers trade in their own account is

uncertain. There is no restriction on a brokerage firm having an
investment account, but it cannot sell directly to customers from this
source. Customers must first be offered shares obtainable from a
jobber or be offered shares at prices better than those obtainable from
a jobber.' 92 This requirement, however, appears to be directed
primarily at maintaining business for London Exchange members
rather than at the prevention of manipulation or the creation of false
markets.
The commission system tends to channel the great bulk of business
through the London Exchange, although some substantial transactions
involving institutions take place off the floor of the Exchange. The
Exchange keeps a registry of agents of different categories and allows
a commission to be shared with them. Under current rules, a bank
may be given one-fourth of the commission, and other agents, such as

191.

STOCK EXCHANGE RULE

78.

192.

STOCK EXCHANGE RULE

199.
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solicitors and accountants, may receive up to one-fifth. A substantial
part of individual trading business comes to the broker through
intermediaries.1 93
The London Exchange seeks to control potential manipulation by
its rule concerning false markets. The rule states: "No member can
knowingly or without due care deal in such a manner as shall promote
or assist in the promotion of a false market."' 94 This rule has served
as the basis for disciplinary actions in the recent past, but there are no
routine checking procedures and members of the Exchange acknowledge that there is little or no supervision of their trading activities.

Critics assert that it is impossible to have adequate regulation of
trading until there exists a more complete disclosure of trading data
by the members. As mentioned earlier, under the current regulations,
jobbers are not required to make any reports of their trading activity
in individual securities to the Exchange. No records are maintained on
trading volumes or prices of individual securities. It is impossible to
reconstruct the complete trading pattern of a particular security, and
fluctuations of price within a single trading period cannot be
determined.
The professional staff of the London Exchange plays only a small
role in the scrutiny of trading activity. No one is assigned the
responsibility of regularly checking for unusual price activity.' 9 This
phase of Exchange activity is left almost entirely to members of the
London Exchange Council. The general sentiment is that the members
of the Council, being continuously on the floor of the Exchange,
"keep their ear to the ground."
The London Exchange recently has taken steps to encourage
prompt disclosure of company activities that are likely to affect
prices. Regulations require prompt and simultaneous announcement
on the Exchange floor of unusual corporate events. The Exchange
equates disclosure to the floor with disclosure to the investing public.
Moreover, the Exchange encourages companies to make announcements during trading hours, between 9:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.'96 The
193.
194.

STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 199.
STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 73 (b).

195. There are plans for mechanization and better scrutiny of trading by the
Exchange. Also the large jobbers that have computers are able to check on
unusual price and volume movements.
196. Although the Exchange requests companies to make announcements
during trading hours, a substantial number do not. There is a view that making
announcements during trading hours gives the professional trader an unfair
advantage over the rest of the public, and that announcements should be made
overnight.
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concern for having announcements made on the Exchange floor is due
in part to the large amount of trading that takes place after hours. Yet
the London Exchange rarely contacts the company to ask if there is
any information that may account for an unusual price movement.' 7
By American standards, the London Exchange seems much less
concerned with unusual price fluctuations. The London Exchange
rarely suspends trading since suspension is considered an extreme
action and takes place only when there is evidence of some improper
corporate behavior. When trading in a security is suspended, however,
it normally remains suspended for a considerable period of time.
The London Exchange receives a fair volume of complaints
concerning the activities of a corporation or a broker. Letters
complaining about a company are usually channeled through the
Quotations Department to the company's broker.' 9 8 The Exchange
takes a somewhat inconsistent view of its relationship to a listed
company: in spite of the fact that a company signs an undertaking
agreement, the general attitude is that the London Exchange has no
direct control over the company. The only sanction available to the
Exchange is withdrawal of the company's quotation. Such drastic
action, the Exchange believes, is more harmful than beneficial to the
investor in most cases. As a consequence, the Exchange rarely follows
up on any complaint letter involving corporate activity unless the case
involves a situation already under independent investigation.
Letters of complaint about the activities of a broker or a jobber
usually come from relatively small investors and typically involve
complaints about failure to deliver securities, excessive commission
charges or poor investment advice. These letters are handled in a
sympathetic, polite manner and are answered primarily with a concern
for public relations. If the investor originally purchased through a
bank, the Exchange will inform the investor that it is the bank that
more appropriately might answer the complaint. In this way, a large
number of complaints are channeled through the bank that dealt
directly with the customer. In these cases, the London Exchange
rarely hears of the situation again. When the investor has dealt
originally through a broker, the Exchange usually responds to the
197. Occasionally, when such unusual movements in the security are brought
to the attention of the Stock Exchange Council, an investigation is made. Usually
the results of these investigations are not made public. In one or two instances
recently, investigations have resulted in disciplinary actions against brokers. As a
result of one recent investigation, brokers were warned against trading with
certain individuals.
198. The Exchange always attempts to communicate through the broker who
handles the company business.
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customer. At the same time, the Exchange, through the Membership
Department, asks the broker to contact the customer. The matter
almost invariably stops at this point; only one or two instances occur
each year that actually involve a hearing before the Exchange Council.
The Exchange appears to be concerned primarily with settling the
matter without adverse publicity and tends to assume that any error
was an innocent or accidental mistake. It does not regard itself as a
policeman and every inquiry is commenced with the attitude that the
broker or jobber involved acted properly.
In viewing the regulation of members by the London Exchange, it is
important to remember that a substantial part of the actual trading
that takes place on the floor of the Exchange is done not by the
members themselves, but by authorized clerks. There are almost no
direct Exchange restrictions on the authorized clerks, but the firm
itself is held responsible for their actions. This removes one step in the
direct regulation by the Exchange, while still preserving the scheme as
a whole.
There are occasional discipline problems concerning a breach of the
rule against advertisng. Until June, 1969, the names of brokerage firms

could appear in print only in a prospectus or when a financial
journalist mentioned a firm in a published financial report. This
restriction is now relaxed to allow a firm's name, or its individual
members' names, to appear either on television or in the financial
press. Apparently, however, most of the older members of the
Exchange approve of the restriction against advertising. They feel that
any investor with a substantial financial interest is able to find a
broker, and they are not particularly interested in attracting the small
investor. There is a strong feeling in most firms that the small investor
is more trouble and expense than he is worth. While this is probably
true, it is a direct consequence of the relatively inefficient method of
handling transactions utilized by many of the firms. Some brokers and
jobbers have expressed a desire to be permitted to advertise and to
make a concentrated effort to attract new investors. They generally
agree that there is a need to protect the investor from false or
misleading claims, but they regard advertising as one way to introduce
desirable competition into the securities business. This issue is
becoming more critical since many unit-trusts advertise extensively
and there is a fear that they will attract investors away from a direct
interest in the market. Many members of the London Exchange would
like to see the development of an active secondary market involving
the small investor similar to that in the United States. Allowing greater
sales effort would help accomplish this goal.
3. Regulation of Financial Stability.-In recent years, the London
Exchange has taken several steps to insure the financial stability of its
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members. In the early 1950's, the Exchange established a compensation fund to provide investor protection against losses due to the
failure of a stock exchange firm. Since that time there have been
numerous claims on the fund, and a substantial volume of money has
been paid to investors. Consequently, the Exchange has taken steps to
insure that its members are financially sound. Under current Exchange
regulations, an individual member is not allowed to trade; only firms
with at least two members may trade. Since 1962, the Exchange has
required its members to prepare a balance sheet and has required each
firm to have an independent annual audit. In 1966, an additional
requirement was added: each firm must forward its balance sheet
within a stated interval after the end of each six-month trading period
to an Exchange accountant for examination. The Exchange accountant must be one of the major accounting firms and must not be
the accounting firm that conducts the firm's audit. The Exchange
requires a minimal capital balance of assets over liabilities equivalent
to 5,000 pounds per partner. The Exchange accountant has authority to

request information from the member about any matter concerning
the account. Apparently, the Exchange itself does not wish to pry into
the business of its members and there are elaborate procedures to
preserve the confidentiality of these reports. Like the United States
exchanges, the London Exchange desires full public disclosure by a
corporation, but not for its own members.

IV.

THE REGULATION OF UNIT TRUSTS

A.

Background

The unit trust in the United Kingdom is an investment device
similar to the open-end mutual fund in the United States. Investors
pool their resources under a trust deed with the acquired investments
held by a trustee. The capital is invested by a mangement company.
The trust deed sets out the respective responsibilities of the
management company and of the trustee, and provides for a division
of the beneficial interests among units held by the investors.' 9 9
The unit trust form of investment is not new to English investors.
In the nineteenth century, trusts were formed by placing a large block
of securities of one company in the custody of a single trustee who
issued certificates that represented a share of the beneficial interests of
the trust. An early English decision held that these trusts were
199. Most trust deeds are terminable after 20 years, but in practice, provisions
for extending the trust's life are utilized so that their lives have been indefinite.
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immune from the provisions of the Companies Act. The court
reasoned that the certificate holders did not form an association
carrying on a business. 2 0
Unit trusts are to be distinguished from "investment trusts," which
also have a long English tradition. Investment trusts are not true
trusts, but are conventional corporations regulated by the Companies
Act. They have as their business purpose the investment of their
shareholders' capital in securities of other companies. The investment
trust is similar to the closed-end mutual fund that exists in the United
States. The open-end mutual fund has not developed in Great Britain,
both because of this early history and because companies are
prohibited from purchasing their own shares under the English
Companies Act.' 0I
The nineteenth century unit trusts held securities of a single
company. 20 2 The first of the modem English unit trusts, formed in
the early 1930's, had a trust fund consisting of securities from
different companies, although the specific investments were fixed by
the terms of the trust deed. The fixed funds have been largely replaced
by trusts that allow managers more freedom to vary the nature of the
underlying investments. 2 0 3 The modem trust deed may or may not
specify the types of securities in which the manager may invest.2 0 4
200. Smith v. Anderson, 15 Ch. D. 247 (C.A. 1880).
201. Arguments in favor of the open-end investment company were presented
to the Jenkin's Committee by Mr. S. I. Fairbaim, the head of the Municipal and
General Securities group, and by the Institute of Chartered Accountants. On the
other hand, The Economist and the Association of Unit Trust Managers strongly
endorsed the unit trust scheme. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 267, 706 &
710.
202. ANDERSON REPORT, supra note 175, at 7. This mixture of securities
from several companies is what distinguished the modem trusts from the 19th
century trusts. In a fixed trust the trust fund securities could be varied; each
beneficial interest represented a certain share of fixed investments.
203. In 1936 there were 67 different trust funds with portfolios totaling £50
million. ANDERSON REPORT, supra note 175, at 7. By 1939 these figures had
increased to £96 and £80 million respectively. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5,
at 710. In mid-1958 unit trust funds were worth about £60 million, but by 1961
there value had increased to over £200 million. Memorandum by TheEconomist,
JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 267. This spectacular growth has continued
throughout the 1960's. As of April, 1967, there were 158 authorized unit trusts
with a total portfolio of £695.5 million.
204. An analysis of the trust deeds of the 45 unit trusts operated by members
of the Association of Unit Trust Managers revealed three main categories. One
type of deed provided a list of permitted securities in which funds might be
invested to the exclusion of all other securities. Of the six unit trusts in this
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The early unit trusts were predominantly "appropriation trusts."
Under this arrangement, new investments were purchased first by the
managers as principal and then transferred to the trust fund at the
current market value in return for corresponding new units. In turn,
these units were then sold to the public for cash. Some appropriation
trusts continue to exist, but most of these are in the form of "cash
trusts."'2 0
The cash trust variation authorizes managers to sell units
to the public on behalf of the trust; the cash vests directly in the trust,
and the trustee purchases securities at the direction of the
manager. 2 o6
While the trust mechanism may appear cumbersome, it is argued
that the basic feature-separation of the management company from
the trustee-provides real protection for the investor. The trustee is
usually one of the large British banks. 2 0 7 Its primary function is to
act as the custodian of the capital and income, and to serve as a
registrar for all unit holders. 2 08 In addition, most trustees exercise
some control over advertising, changes in investment policy, and
changes in management. The degree of control granted and the
trustee's use of its control varies considerably from case to case. There
is, however, no reported instance in which a trustee has changed or
dismissed a manager, who is generally responsible for administering
the trust. More specifically, the manager is responsible for calculating
the bid and ask price of the unit, maintaining a market in the unit,

category, two were rather restrictive, limiting investment to 34 specified
securities, and one was virtually unrestricted, having a list of 450 different
securities. Twenty other unit trusts worked under deeds allowing managers total
freedom to select investments but required the trustee's consent before a selected
security could be initially purchased. Most of the deeds in this second category
gave the managers complete control over future purchases and sales of any
security which had received the consent of the trustee. The remaining 19 deeds
provided for even greater flexibility, giving the manager authority to invest in any
security quoted on a recognized stock exchange or any other security approved by
the trustee. See generally Supplementary Memorandum by the Association of Unit
Trust Managers, JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 723-26.
205. The cash trust is the only type of appropriation trust currently
authorized by the Board of Trade.
206. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 118.
207. It is reported that The Midland Bank is trustee for about 40 different
unit trusts. In a few instances companies serve as trustee.
208. See generally, JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 660-64 (Committee
questions to the officers of the Association of Unit Trust Managers). As custodian,
the trustee must be certain no new units are issued unless securities of
corresponding value have been deposited.
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preparing income distributions and managing the fund's investment
portfolio. 2 0 9
Another modem development has been the public sale of unit trust
shares coupled with insurance policies. The Board of Trade has taken
the position that insurance companies can sell these policies by any of
the traditional selling methods, including the door-to-door technique.
The United States approach of defining variable annuities as securities
has not been followed in England.2 1
This means that English
insurance companies have virtually a free hand not only in selling
insurance-linked unit trusts, but also in other aspects of account

management as well.
B.

Current Regulation of Unit Trusts

In 1936, the Board of Trade appointed the Anderson Committee to
examine all aspects of fixed trusts and to recommend appropriate
government action. 2 1 1 The Committee broadened the scope of its
inquiry to embrace unit trusts as well. The basic thrust of the
Anderson Committee proposals was to treat the unit trust as a special
type of limited company; investor protection was to be secured by
disclosure, which would enable the investor to analyze and compare
the various unit trusts.2 1 2 The Anderson Report contains much more
in the way of specific recommendations than the later Jenkins
Committee Report. 2 1 1 Parliament, however, has never responded to
the Anderson Report with the type of legislation recommended-a
system of registration and regulation similar to that provided by the
Companies Act. Instead, the approach has been to regulate unit trusts
under the Prevention of Fraud Act 2 14 and to prevent advertising and
209. See Memorandum by the Association of Unit Trust Managers, JENKINS

supra note 5, at 709. It is estimated that one group of managers-the
Save & Prosper group-control approximately 50% of the funds invested in the
unit trusts. Recently some of the large clearing banks such as Lloyds and
Westminster have begun to manage unit trusts.
210. In S.E.C. v. Variable Annunity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65
(1959), the United States Supreme Court held that variable annunities sold by
insurance companies are securities.
REPORT,

211.
212.
212.
213.

ANDERSON REPORT, supra note
ANDERSON REPORT, supra note
ANDERSON REPORT, supra note
JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5,

175, at 7.
175, at 21.
175, at 21.
at 706; ANDERSON REPORT, supra

note 175, at 27. The Anderson Report contains an excellent discussion and
analysis of the regulatory problems of unit trusts.
214. This Act was designed primarily to prevent share-pushing. JENKINS
REPORT, supra note 5, at 117. The Act was the first legislation expressly dealing
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the issuing of circulars unless the trust is "authorized" by the Board of
Trade. The statute has remained virtually unchanged since 1939, but
the semi-official and unofficial regulations by the Board of Trade have
grown extensively.
The key to the system of regulation is § 17 of the Prevention of
Fraud Act. 2 ' s Section 17 provides that the Board of Trade may
authorize the existence of any unit trust scheme that meets certain
specified conditions to the satisfaction of the Board. The authorization of a unit trust scheme has two important consequences: first, the
trustee and manager are exempt from the provision of the Prevention
of Fraud Act, which prohibits securities dealing unless the dealer is
exempted or properly licensed; 2' 6 and second, the manager is exempt
from the Act's prohibition against distribution or possession of any

circulars encouraging the purchase or sale of securities. 2 ' 7 However,
the general exemptions in the Act, which cover members of
recognized stock exchanges and others such as large banks, do not
apply to the activities of the unit trusts. 2 I 8 Thus, even if both the
trustee and the manager have exemptions under the Prevention of
Fraud Act for their usual securities dealings, they still could not issue
circulars that relate to a unit trust unless the unit trust, itself, is
authorized.
The tax consequences of obtaining authorization are also important. The current British tax laws exempt an underlying trust from the
institutional capital gains tax. This exemption applies, however, only
to authorized unit trusts. Unless all members of an unauthorized unit
trust are exempt, as in the case of a charitable unit trust, the British
tax laws make a continuation of such a trust impractical.
The Board of Trade has not attempted to bring insurance-linked
unit trusts or investment trusts (i.e., closed-end mutual funds) under
its jurisdiction. Units of such trusts are traded like the securities of
any other public company under the Companies Act.2 1 9
with unit trusts. The provisions from the 1939 Act were re-enacted and
consolidated in the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, and,
therefore, have remained the basis for unit trust control for 28 years.
215. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45.
216. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §
2 (1) (c).
217. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §
14 (3) (a) (iv).
218. See the licensing provisions in the 1958 Prevention of Fraud Act and
the exemptions provided in § 17. The proviso to § 14 (3) expressly declares that
the exceptions stated in § 14 (3) (a) for such persons as members of recognized
stock exchanges do not apply to unit dealing.
219. Although a "unit trust scheme" is defined in § 26 (1) of the 1958 Act,
Winter, 1971
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The specific statutory requirements for authorization under the
Prevention of Fraud Act appear to be rather limited. The Act requires
that the trustee and the manager be incorporated in the United
Kingdom and have places of business in the United Kingdom; that the
trustee be independent of the manager; and that the trustee have a
specified minimum capital and sufficient assets to meet its liabilities.2 2 0 In addition, the trust deed must fulfill the requirements of
the first schedule of the Act "to the satisfaction of the Board [of
Trade] ."2 21 It is this last provision that has provided the real basis for
the development of the regulation of unit trusts.
In a manner uncharacteristic of securities regulation in Great
Britain, the Board of Trade has used great imagination and initiative to
expand its meager statutory base and to provide substantial regulation
over the unit trust. The approach of the Board is typified by its
regulation of sales fees. The Prevention of Fraud Act provides simply
that the trust deed must include the manner of calculating the sale and

purchase price and the yield of the units. Operating from this base, the
Board of Trade has refused to authorize a unit trust if the amount of
the service charge stated in the trust deed exceeds a maximum limit
set by the Board. The Board has contended that the words "to the
satisfaction of the Board" vest discretionary power in the Board. Since
the Act requires that each deed state the manner in which prices for
units are calculated, an appropriate exercise of this discretion would
include setting a maximum fee. In the one case challenging this
discretion, the authority of the Board of Trade was upheld.2 2 2
Furthermore, the Board of Trade requires that certain items be
included in the trust deed as a condition to authorization. 2 2 3 The

so that the underlying investments could consist of "securities or any other
property whatsoever," only trust funds consisting of securities and cash have been
authorized.
220. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §
17.
221. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §
17 (1) (c).
222. The use of this power was challenged in Allied Investors' Trusts, Ltd. v.
Board of Trade, [1956] Ch. 232. The Board of Trade had refused to authorize a
unit trust because the amount of the service charges stated in the trust deed
exceeded the maximum arbitrarily set by the Board. The Board contended that
the setting of maximum service charges under the 1958 Act was a proper exercise
of this discretion, since the service charge was an integral of the unit price. The
court accepted this argument and upheld the Board's action.

223. The Board of Trade requirements relating to the First Schedule have
been printed and are distributed to interested persons.
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Board requires that the trust instrument contain provisions identifying
the charges that can be added to the unit price, both at the time of
sale and at the time of redemption or repurchase. 2 4 In calculating
the yield, the yearly income of the trust is to be determined by taking
the dividend income from the underlying securities, less a specified
periodic service charge, less net tax requirements. The initial sales
charge cannot exceed five per cent of the unit price. Contractual plans
are permitted, but there can be no front-end load and the five per cent
sales charge cannot include more than one and one-half per cent as a
sales commission. 2' 2 The Board of Trade also requires that the trust
deed contain a provision that securities purchased by the manager be
invested in the trust at the lowest price on a recognized stock
exchange on the day of investing.2 2 6 Moreover, there cannot be any
indemnification clauses designed to protect trustees against fraud,
negligence or acts of their own agents. 2 2

The Board has set a number of specific accounts which must be
maintained, and has designed these accounts to reveal gross and net
profits that the managers derive from the fund. Among the other
items to be included are the sales commissions paid to those persons
marketing the units, the cost to the manager of repurchased units and
the proceeds derived from the sale of repurchased units. The accounts
224. The Board has also laid down rules for calculating the repurchase price
of units; the price so calculated has become known as the Board of Trade price. It
is calculated by taking the sales price of the securities corresponding to the units,
(or if the securities are not sold, the highest market bid price of the corresponding
securities) together with an aliquot share of all other assets held by the trustee
(cash, etc.) less any duties, commissions, and charges payable with respect to the
sale of such securities or which would have been payable if the corresponding
securities were sold. To determine the repurchase price for each unit, the resulting
total from above is divided by the number of units sold, and this quotient is
reduced by the lesser of 3d or one per cent.
225. These are unwritten requirements. They must be determined from
existing trust instruments of authorized unit trusts, and from direct contact with
the staff of the Board of Trade.
226. In appropriation trusts, however, the securities sold by the manager to
the trust on the same day the manager bought the securities are to be vested in the
trust at the price paid by the manager. In any other case, the securities are to be
vested at the lowest offered market price on a recognized stock exchange on the
day of vesting. The trustee is to be empowered to unilaterally reject any securities
which, in his opinion, infringe the terms of the trust deed.
227. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-31. The Committee, pointing to
the broad indemnity clauses protecting managers and trustees, recognized the
danger of unit trust investors being left without legal remedies for fraudulent and
negligent handling of their funds.
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must also show the proceeds from the sale of underlying securities of

liquidated units, advertising expenses and total service charges
received.2 2 8
There are limitations established by the Board concerning the
minimum diversification of the trust. No more than five per cent of
the fund may be invested in a single security, and the fund is
forbidden to acquire more than ten per cent of the total shares of a
single company. The trust is also forbidden, by unwritten rules, from
investing in any assets other than securities,2 2 9 from borrowing or
investing on borrowed capital and from investing in unquoted
securities unless specifically authorized in the trust deed.
Through the device of undertakings, the Board has used its
discretion to impose the requirement that the unit trust manager
refrain from marketing units door-to-door. The Board also requires
undertakings that it be notified of any change in the trustees, that the
trustees exercise effective control over the affairs of the trust and that
the trustees remain independent of the manager. 2 3 0 These requirements for obtaining or retaining authorization have evolved over a
period of time. There has been, however, no direct attempt to obtain
agreement from earlier unit trusts that they will conduct their business
in accordance with the current standards.
In addition to these requirements, the Board of Trade not only
keeps its own rogues gallery, but also checks with the Bank of England
and occasionally with the London Stock Exchange to insure that
those persons requesting authorization to start a unit trust have a good
record. Authorization of a unit trust occasionally has been denied on
the grounds of the poor reputation of the participants, although this
has never been given as an express reason.
The Prevention of Fraud Act provides for the revocation of
authorization by the Board if the conditions of the authorization are

not fulfilled or if circumstances relevant to the authorization have
changed. 2 31 The Act also provides that the Board of Trade may
228. There must also be accounts showing the distribution of the fund value
among the various securities and particulars on the income distribution to unit
holders.
229. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 118.
230. Undertakings are required in letter form to be sent to the Board of
Trade.
231. A procedure for handling a revocation is set down in § 17 (2) of the
1958 Prevention of Fraud Act. As just stated, the power to revoke authorization
has never been utilized. Section 17 (3) directs the Board to publish annually
particulars of every authorized unit trust. Finally, § 12 provides that the Board of
Trade may appoint inspectors to investigate and report on the administration of
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appoint inspectors to investigate and report on the administration of
any unit trust.2 3 2 To date, there is no reported instance of the Board
of Trade's entering into any revocation proceedings; nor has there
been any instance in which inspectors have been appointed.2 3 3
Beyond the activities of the Board of Trade, two other relatively

minor means of regulating unit trusts exist. First, the London Stock
Exchange allows shares of unit trusts to obtain a listing and has special
disclosure rules relating to unit trusts.2 3 4 Relatively few unit trusts,
however, have obtained Exchange quotations for their shares and the
effect of the Exchange regulations has not been great. Second,
approximately 75 per cent of the unit trusts belong to the Association
of Unit Trust Managers. Historically, this Association has engaged
primarily in lobbying. Recently, however, it has played a more active
role as a self-regulatory body. The Association's Code of Conduct
requires that all advertising be submitted in advance to the Secretary
of the Association. The Association also regulates the commissions
paid to the intermediaries that sell units. Under the Code, intermediaries must belong to a recognized professional group or satisfy
the Association on an individual basis. This is considered to be the
first step in the attempt to regulate selling practices. 2 35
C. Areas of CurrentConcern in the Unit Trust Regulation
Many of the recommendations of the Anderson and Jenkins
Reports concerning unit trust regulations have been implemented
through the informal development of rules within the Board of Trade.
There are differing opinions of the effectiveness of the existing unit
trust regulation; nonetheless, the following concerns frequently are
expressed within the financial community.
1. Codification.-There is a need for the consolidation and
codification of the regulations that are now in force by the Board of
Trade. Many rules can be determined only through interviews with the
Board, although some have been written in the form of Board of
Trade notes. While there is concern about the unchecked discretion
any unit trust scheme, if it is in the interest of the unit holders and the matter is
one of public concern.
232. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, § 12.
233. The Board of Trade staff for unit trust requirements appears to be of
high quality but extremely small and overworked. In 1968 there were only two
persons involved and they also had responsibility for licensing and granting
exemptions for dealers under the Prevention of Fraud Act.
234. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES, app. 35.
235. Financial Times, May 20, 1967.
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that exists in the Board of Trade, there is also a desire to give current
regulations retroactive effect so that it would not be possible for
established trusts to continue to operate as originally constituted.
2. Income Disclosure.-There is a need for better disclosure and
control over the income received by managers. Income is produced in
a unit trust in a number of ways, several of which are neither obvious
nor exposed. One source of income is derived from the sale of new
units and the buying and selling of existing units. There also may be a
profit derived from holding the unit while the market rises, and an
astute manager can earn a price-spread profit due to the gap between
the offered and the bid price of the underlying securities. 2 3 6 Income
can also be obtained from brokerage fees collected from the trust for
dealing in the underlying securities. The manager sometimes obtains a
split 9ommission and other reciprocal arrangements are common. In
addition, when a manager sells securities directly as a result of
advertisements, it may keep the full five per cent sales charge that
includes the one and one-half per cent sales commission. All of these
sources supplement the manager's normal service charge, which itself
has been criticized because of the various ways that it may be
calculated. While there have been some suggestions that these items
should be specifically regulated, it is generally agreed that as a
minimum there should be fuller disclosure than at present.
3. Maximum Sales Charge Regulations.-The regulation of service
and sales charges by the Board of Trade has been questioned because
236. The Association of Unit Trust Managers sought to justify unit dealing
arguing that it enables the managers to better control the expansion and
contraction of the fund, since underlying securities need not be bought and sold
at the moment units are bought and sold, and better control of the fund enables
them to improve the trusts' performances because buying can be avoided during
narrow markets and vice versa. Memorandum by the Association of Unit Trust

Managers, JENKINS

REPORT,

supra note 5, at 668. This argument appears to

carry little force, as the managers could operate just as effectively with a cash
slush fund owned by the trust as they do with their own cash. Profit from unit
dealing appears to be inherent in an investment scheme where a major portion of
those buying and selling units are small, unsophisticated investors who frequently
buy on an up-market and sell on a down-market. One prominent manager testified
that he was unaware of any manager who failed to profit from unit dealing and
that his company had profited for 29 consecutive years regardless of the character
of the securities market. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 706.
Neither the Anderson Committee nor the Jenkins Committee recommended
the prohibition of managers dealing as principals in units. The Anderson
Committee, however, recognized the problem and sought to control it by
requiring the distribution of extensive accounts revealing all forms of the
manager's profit.
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of the lack of specific statutory authority. 2 7 Beyond this, however,
there is the complaint that the maximum charge limitations are
arbitrary and unrelated to actual costs. The charge limitations are
uniform, while costs vary with the size of the fund and the unit
turnover. It is argued that the control of charges may have several
undesirable effects. For example, it may encourage managers to rely
on their profits from dealing in units and brokerage rather than on the
service charge for their investment advice. The Board of Trade argues,
however, that the control of charges has had the beneficial effect of
discouraging advertising and active selling pressure. This is probably
true. On the other hand, it is argued that the limits may encourage
resort to block offers that may be prejudicial to existing unit
holders2 3 8 or that may make it difficult for new funds to enter the
market and become competitive.
4. Regulation of the Manager and Trustee.-Under the current
scheme, managers and trustees assume only a minimal legal responsibility toward the unit holders. Correspondingly, there is a paucity of
remedies available to the unit holders.2 3 9 The current regulatory
scheme provides three types of protection. First, the Board of Trade
has power to investigate the administration of the unit trust and to
withdraw its authorization. This power has never been used. Second,
all trust instruments authorize the trustee to exercise control over the
237. There is no historical basis for charge control in either the Anderson
Report or the Parliamentary debate related to the Prevention of Fraud Act.
JENKINS REPORT, supra note 5, at 1557.
238. Because the low charges would not cover sustained advertising, managers
utilize block offers to concentrate their advertising. JENKINS REPORT, supra
note 5, at 718-19. A block offer is an offering of a large number of units in a
block sale for a limited period at a set price or at the current value of the unit,
whichever is lower.
239. The Jenkins Committee suggested that all managers and trustees
covenant that the unit trust scheme properly complies with the law, that the unit
holder should be given civil remedies for breach of all statutory requirements even
if they are not in the trust deed, and that the managers should be subject to
criminal penalties for failure to comply with statutory rules. The Committee also
suggested that the Board be given power to remove managers and trustees and
appoint new ones in their place. The Anderson Committee was also especially
concerned with the relative lack of control by unit holders in comparison to
shareholders. To increase the influence of a unit holder, it was recommended that
all trust deeds provide power and machinery to remove the manager and trustee
by a majority vote of the unit holders, and that the deeds provide for a unit holders
committee whose powers were to be defined by the holders themselves (among
the powers to be specifically given to the committee was a power to initiate legal
proceedings on behalf of the trust).
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manager and even to dismiss the manager. In practice, the bulk of the
control resides in the manager and it is probably unrealistic to expect
the trustee to check on anything other than the most obvious type of
fraud. In addition, the trustee normally has strong pecuniary interests

that discourage him from disrupting his relationship with the
manager. 2 4 0 Third, the required disclosure off information concerning
the administration of the trust is designed to enable the investing
public to check on improper practices. As suggested earlier, however,
only minimal information is required to be disclosed and the legal
remedies available for false or misleading information are limited.
5. Regulation of Selling Practices.-Finally, there has been a
growing recognition that explicit regulation of selling practices is
needed. At present, advertising is regulated only by the limits imposed
on service charges and the self-regulatory activities of trustees and the
Association of Unit Trust Managers. Limiting advertising expenditures,
however, has been criticized as an indiscriminate method that limits
good as well as bad advertising. Conceivably, it would be better to
formulate rules regarding content. Door-to-door selling is regulated
only through undertakings required of newly authorized trusts, and
there is no restriction on the common practice of providing extra
compensation to stock brokers, bankers, investment counselors and
others. This practice has been criticized as a disruption of their role as
independent agents and as an incentive for pressure selling. Furthermore, there is no regulation of the insurance industry with respect to
its door-to-door selling or management of unit trusts.
6. Comparison with the United States.-The above comments are
made with the recognition that, in some respects, the regulation of
unit trusts in the United Kingdom is broader and more specific than
the regulation of selling practices by limiting initial sales charges and
forbidding front-end load funds. There is also concern in the United
States over the standards for determining appropriate service charges
for managers. In both of these areas, the United Kingdom has specific
restrictions. In many respects, the role of the non-affiliated investor in
the United States is similar to that of the trustee in the United
Kingdom. Although the British trusteee appears to carry out its
functions in better fashion, the disclosure requirements are more
stringent under the Investment Companies Act in the United States.
There is also a greater continuing control exercised by the S.E.C. over

both the nature and diversification of the investment of mutual funds,
and the real or potential conflicts of interests.

240. The recommendations made by the Anderson Committee and the law
relating to the sale of company shares would provide workable rules.
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TAKE-OVER BIDS

A. Introduction
A take-over bid refers to an attempt by one company to gain
control of another through the acquisition of a sufficient number of
shares of the latter's voting stock. This method is in contrast to
merger, consolidation or a purchase of the assets of one company by

another. There may be a variety of reasons for choosing one method,
or combination of methods, over another. One fundamental advantage
of gaining control of a company through a take-over is that the
purchase of shares sufficient to control the target company can be
accomplished without the cooperation--and even over the opposition-of the directors of the acquired company.
The tender used in the take-over may involve cash or securities or
both. Consequently, security regulations problems often arise in a
take-over bid situation. The purchasing company makes a public
offering if it utilizes an issued security to effect a share-for-share
transfer of the securities of the target company. In the United States,
this new offering would have to be registered in the same manner as
any other public offering. The Companies Act in the United Kingdom
exempts such a new offering from regisration since only purchases for
cash, not share-for-share transfers, are subject to the registration
requirements of the Companies Act. Nevertheless, if the new shares
were to be listed on a stock exchange, they would be subject to the
same disclosure requirements as any other new issue. On the other
hand, in cash-tender offers, the purchasing company is not issuing
securities. Thus, the usual registration and listing requirements would
not apply in either Great Britain or the United States.
Shareholder protection during a take-over bid is needed in order to
insure disclosure to minority shareholders so that they can make
sound investment decisions regarding whether or not to sell stocks.
This can be characterized as a need for a reverse prospectus, which, in
effect, would provide disclosure protection to the minority shareholder at the time of "selling pressure" during a take-over bid. Such a

reverse prospectus would complement the disclosure requirements of
the Companies Act and the Exchange Rules currently provided at the
time of "buying pressure" during an initial offering of securities.
Additionally, there is a need to regulate the mechanics of the bid
process and to prohibit certain kinds of activities that work to the
disadvantage of minority shareholders. For several years, the financial
community in the United Kingdom has recognized the need for special
investor protections during take-over bids. The measure of effectiveness of securities regulation appears to be judged in large part on the
basis of the take-over bid protection. This problem has received more
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attention in the United Kingdom than any other problem of securities
regulation.2 41
B. DisclosuresRequired Duringa Take-Over Bid

In the normal take-over bid situation, the purchasing company
circulates a purchase offer to all shareholders of the target company.
Under the Prevention of Fraud Act of 1958, the circulation of
documents with a view to acquisition, as well as the disposition of
securities, is prohibited unless there is some specific exemption or
unless the parties circulating the documents are licensed by the Board
of Trade. A corporation is exempted under the Act only when it is
circulating documents to its own shareholders. Consequently, unless a
corporation becomes a licensed dealer or obtains a special exemption
from the Board of Trade, the actual circulation of a take-over bid
offer must be made by a broker, issuing house, bank or other
exempted party.
As part of its rules of conduct for licensed dealers, the Board of
Trade has issued specific requirements dealing with the contents of
take-over offers. These requirements officially apply to the relatively
few licensed dealers. In practice, however, it is reported that they are
followed by banks, brokers and others in an exempted status. The
rules require that the terms of the tender offer must be delivered to
the offeree corporation not less than three days prior to the time that
the offer is made to its shareholders. The document containing the
offer must include the following information:
(1) for stock exchange securities, the price range during the
period of six months preceding the offer;
(2) provisions that the offer remain open for at least 21 days
unless it is totally withdrawn;
(3) if the offer is conditional, the latest dates on which the

offeror can declare it unconditional;
(4) if the offer relates to less than the total number of shares,
provisions for a pro rata tender of shares by offeree shareholders;
(5) the number of shares in the offeree company held by the
offeror;
(6) details on the terms of the offer, time of payment and
nature of payment; and

241. Although not a part of the original study, a brief description of take-over
bid regulation is included. More has been written on this aspect of securities
regulation than any other. E.g., Pennington, Takeover Bids in the United
Kingdom, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 159 (1969).
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(7) whether any special benefits or any special contractual
arrangements have been promised to directors of the offeree
company.
Additionally, the rules of conduct provide that if a licensed dealer
circulates a response from the directors of the offeree corporation, the

response must contain specified information. Although this provision,
like the other provisions found in the rules, is not legally binding upon
companies that communicate directly with their own shareholders or
that utilize an exempted broker or bank, it is generally reported to be
followed in practice. The information in the response to be circulated
must include the following:
(1) the number of shares held by each director, and whether the
director has accepted or intends to accept the offer with respect
to these shares;
(2) whether the directors hold any shares in the offeror
corporation;
(3) whether there has been offered any payment as compensation for loss of office, and whether any director has an interest
in the contracts entered into by the offeror; and
(4) whether there has been any material change in the financial
position of the offeree corporation since the date of the last
balance sheets.
Furthermore, the British stock exchanges have direct control over
disclosures made during a take-over bid situation if new securities are
to be offered through a share-per-share transfer. First, the offeror
company can be made to make disclosures in connection with its
listing application. Second, the circulars of listed companies that are
sent to their own shareholders are controlled by the stock exchanges.
Third, any recommendation to accept or reject an offer must be
submitted to the stock exchanges. Finally, the exchanges have
adopted the regulations promulgated by the Board of Trade described
above.

C. The City Code on Take-Overs
The rules for licensed dealers were enacted in 1960. In 1963, the
London Stock Exchange issued the Revised Notes on Amalgamations
and Mergers that were designed not only to cover gaps in the
disclosures during take-over bid situations, but also to take tentative
steps toward regulating the conduct of brokers and other parties
involved. One of the main objectives of the Revised Notes was to
prevent persons who had inside information of the pending bids from
making a profit from their knowledge. A second goal was to insure
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equality of treatment of shareholders during a time when bids,
counter-bids and revised bids were being made. A third objective was
to give shareholders sufficient information to make their own
decisions on whether or not to accept a bid. Lastly, the Revised Notes

were intended to prevent the companies involved from engaging in
competitive bidding tactics that would benefit their own position. The
statements of policy, however, were all quite general and applied only
to listed companies and members of the London Stock Exchange. It
was soon recognized that there was a need to expand the coverage of
the Revised Notes. Consequently, the City Code on Take-Overswas
drafted by a committee that included representatives from the Bank
of England, the London Exchange, the Association of Investment
Trusts, issuing houses and merchant banks. The Code was adopted in
1968, revised to strengthen its language, and republished in its present
form in April, 1969. Although the Bank of England has taken a more
active role in the recent revision of the Code, the general enforcement
structure remains that of a self-regulatory group.
Earlier visions of the Code were not followed because the language
was vague. Under the current draft, however, the language is quite
specific in most areas, and it is difficult for offenders to argue a lack
of understanding of the Code. Additionally, the current Code provides
for a supervisory panel that has responsibility to supervise enforcement and to make interpretations in specific cases. Hopefully, the
panel will make frequent reports in order to establish a body of case
law covering the standards of practice.
Nothwithstanding these improvements, the current Code continues
to lack effective sanctions. For example, if a company violates the
Take-Over Code, the London Exchange, as an ultimate sanction, can
withdraw its listing. This is likely, however, to be most harmful to the
shareholders whom the Code is trying to protect. For other parties in
take-over bid situations-issuing houses, banks and brokers-the only
real sanction is that of adverse publicity. Additionally, there is the
possibility that the Association of Issuing Houses might expel or
otherwise sanction one of its members, but this has never happened.
Finally, the Board of Trade might be willing to withdraw the
exemption applicable to banks and issuing houses, but there is no

indication that this sanction will ever be employed.
Nevertheless, the Code contains provisions controlling disclosure as
well as direct regulations governing the procedure to be followed in
take-over bid situations. The Code reaffirms the disclosure requirements mentioned above and designates other specific areas where
disclosure is needed. In general, the disclosures required in the United
Kingdom are similar to the disclosures required in the United States.
In the United States, no tender offer for more than ten per cent of the
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equity securities in a company can be made without information being
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Furthermore, any
person who has a ten per cent interest or more in one of the
companies involved must disclose this to the company involved and to
the S.E.C. In addition, target companies must abide by disclosure rules
in communications with their own shareholders.
The direct regulations of the Take-Over Code, however, are more
extensive than those that exist in the United States. Under the Code,
the target company is provided protection against a surprise take-over
since its board must be informed prior to the time an offer is made to
its shareholders. Additionally, the Code provides protection for the
offeror company. The target company must act in good faith in any
rejection that it makes of a tender offer and, if it provides information
to one offering company, it must provide similar data to all other
offerors. Moreover, a target company must act in good faith in the
transfer of stock certificates. Similarly, it is prohibited from issuing
authorized but unissued shares, or from selling assets during the time
that the tender offer is outstanding. None of these restrictions are
present in the American legislation. Also, the Take-Over Bid Code goes
further in direct shareholder protection since the terms of the offer
itself are controlled and an offering company is restricted in declaring
an offer unconditional unless it in fact has control. Additionally, there
are specific provisions to prevent the sale of control stock that may
prejudice minority shareholders, and an offering company cannot pay
a higher price to some shareholders than it pays to others. United
States legislation contains a few aspects of direct regulation, but it is
not nearly as extensive as in the United Kingdom. In the U.S., if there
is an increase in the offer price of a tender, the increase must be made
to all. There is no prohibition, however, on a purchase of blocks of
stock outside of the tender at a higher price.
In the United Kingdom, the financial press has been most critical of
the failure to enforce the Take-Over Bid Code, and periodically there
is an editorial suggesting the need for an S.E.C.-type organization to
provide better enforcement. On the substantive aspects, however, the
Code provisions in the United Kingdom provide more protection than

their counterparts in the United States.
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